( 1 ) ). THIS is an appeal under S. 96 of C. P. C. at the instance of the original defendants against whom the trial Court has passed a decree of eviction, a decree in monetary terms payable to the plaintiff by the defendant by way of damages and a further decree as to mesne profits.

( 2 ) ). The plaintiff, Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation, had filed a suit before a regular Civil Court viz. the Court of Civil Judge (Senior Division), valsad in respect of the premises in which the defendant was inducted by the plaintiff, and where the defendant was running a canteen. The plaintiff had contended that the defendant was a licensee, and that on the date of the expiry of the tenure of the licence they were required to hand over vacant possession.

( 3 ) ). The defendant resisted the suit by the written statement at Exh. 9 and contended that it was not a licensee as alleged by the plaintiff, but was in fact a tenant within the meaning of the Bombay Rent Act. It also resisted the claim for mesne profits, etc. . It also appears that the defendant raised a contention as to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court.

( 4 ) ). On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, the trial Court framed various issues which arose on that account. In this context issue No. 8a is the only issue relevant at this stage. This issue reads as under :"8a. Whether this Court has got no jurisdiction to try this suit in view of Sec. 16 of Gujarat Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) act, 1972?"

( 5 ) THIS Act is hereinafter referred to as "the Act" or "the said Act"

( 6 ) ). The trial Court decided this issue, in my opinion, in a highly simplistic and casual manner. The trial Court merely observed that the suit was filed in 1970 (actually it was filed on 9th October 1970), whereas, according to the trial Court, the said Act came into force from 1972. In fact the said Act is Act No. 12 of 1973 and came into force from 26th June 1973. The trial court had taken note of the decision of this Court in the case of Shivubha v. G. S. R. T. Corporation, reported in 1977 GLR 656, which on interpretation of Sec. 16 of the said Act clearly lays down the interpretation of the word "entertain" to mean that it would clearly oust the jurisdiction of the civil Courts. The trial Court then noted a decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Mulsing Dhulaji v. Municipal Corporation of Ahmedabad, reported in 1978 GLR 266, and found that the latter decision holds that the Act is not retrospective, and would not adversely affect the rights of a plaintiff in respect of a suit which had already been filed and was pending on the date when the Act came into force. The trial Court, therefore, held that it had jurisdiction to decide the suit and to pass a decree as prayed for.

( 7 ) ). Accordingly, after appreciating the evidence on record, the trial Court found in favour of the plaintiff and passed a decree for eviction against the defendants.

( 8 ) ). This question of jurisdiction is the crux of the controversy before me in the present appeal.

( 9 ) ). I may clarify that it is not as though other factual aspects are not challenged or that the factual findings recorded by the trial Court on other issues have been accepted. This observation on my part is merely to indicate that the question of jurisdiction of the trial Court, in the context of S. 16 of the said Act, is the only issue urged and argued before me.

( 10 ) ). Learned Counsel for the respective parties have addressed me at considerable length and have cited extensively from various decisions. In my opinion, in view of my final conclusion indicated hereinafter, I need not discuss each and every decision cited before me in extensive detail. I shall, therefore, only refer to the decisions cited before me in the context of the principle or ratio laid down therein, and the interplay of the various decisions inter se.

( 11 ) ). The first of such decision is a decision of a Single Judge o