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2002 Supreme(Guj) 544

Gujarat High Court
Judgename :AKSHAY H.MEHTA
CENTRAL BANK OF INDIA - Appellant
Versus
MAVJI C.LAKUM - Respondent
S.C.A. 8053 of 1998
Decided On : 07/25/2002

Advocates Appeared: ARUN H.MEHTA, NALIN K.THAKKAR

Headnote:

Gujarat Secondary Education Act, 1972 - Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 - Section 11-A - Petition main question that is involved is what is scope of Labor Court or Tribunal or National Tribunal while exercising power - Though this question has time and again come for consideration before Apex Court as this Court and other High Courts in this petition same has been extensively argued by both sides and required to deal with that issue and determine same on basis of submissions made by counsels and decisions and provisions of law cited by them in support of their respective submissions - Petitioner is Central Bank of India having its Head Office at Bombay and a Branch Office - Respondent joined service of petitioner at Peon and subsequently was promoted to post of Head Peon - In year was working as Head Peon and at that time petitioner received repeated complaints regarding misbehavior of respondent with clients of bank its officers and other members of office staff - In view petitioner served respondent with a charge-sheet and after detailed inquiry into acts of misconduct of respondent was discharged from service with effect - Petitioner discharging respondent from service was challenged by him in Court of Civil Judge by instituting Civil Suit being said suit came to be dismissed against which respondent preferred Civil Appeal before District Court - Disciplinary Authority by taking into consideration entire record placed before it with regard to inquiry held against respondent including his explanation submitted in response to show cause – Held, At this juncture it would also be necessary to refer to decisions cited by support of his contention that Labor Courts and Tribunals have wide powers to enter into the questions of fact reappreciate evidence and on strength of same come to its own conclusion and to either set aside the order of discharge/dismissal or substitute the same with lesser penalty, if in the opinion of the Court or the Tribunal that the penalty imposed upon the delinquent is harsh considering the degree of guilt proved against him - Further to find out by reappreciating evidence whether conclusions arrived at by authority are proper and whether penalty imposed upon delinquent degree of proved guilt is justified - There cannot be any dispute with regard to these powers - However these decisions do not lay down the principle or guidelines in accordance with which these powers are required to be exercised - So far reappreciation of evidence is concerned naturally with a view to find out the justification of imposing penalty of discharge/dismissal by employer upon workman Labor Court or Tribunal has to carry out finding exercise but to quash decision or to substitute said decision with its own Labor Court or Tribunal has to act within frame work of Eynesbury principle - Unless that test is satisfied and the cogent and reliable reasons for arriving at such satisfaction are adequately narrated and conclusions drawn are properly recorded in order decision of authority for employee cannot be set aside or altered - In other words Labor Court/tribunal is not only required to conclude that action/decision of employer is illegal or perverse or so disproportionate that it shocks judicial conscience or it is based on irrelevant material or relevant material has not been taken into consideration or that it is so unreasonable that no prudent man could have made decision - Tribunal is also required to put on record reasons for arriving at conclusions - Decisions cited by do not deal with this aspect - Issue in controversy has been adequately dealt with by decisions that have been cited by has also relied on two decisions of Apex Court delivered in case and in case of reported - Both these decisions are in respect of a dispute which had arisen provisions of Gujarat Secondary Education Act - Scope of powers of Tribunal constituted said Act while reviewing of orders passed by management in disciplinary matters and to give its own findings and to substitute punishment has been considered - Provisions of powers o Tribunal set up said Act are provisions conferred upon Labor Courts and Tribunals of Act - In both these decisions Apex Court has considered case of Union of India reported and has arrived at same conclusion - Petition allowed (Para 6)

AKSHAY H. MEHTA, J.

( 1 ) IN this petition the main question that is involved is what is the scope of the Labour Court or the Tribunal or National Tribunal while exercising power under Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short "the Act") ? Though this question has time and again come for consideration before the Apex Court as well as this Court and other High Courts, in this petition the same has been extensively argued by both the sides and I am, therefore, required to deal with that issue and determine the same on the basis of submissions made by the learned counsels and the decisions and provisions of law cited by them in support of their respective submissions.

( 2 ) THE facts that have given rise to the present controversy can be stated as under :-2. 1. THE petitioner is Central Bank of India having its Head Office at Bombay and a Branch Office at Jamnagar. The respondent joined the service of petitioner at Jamnagar on 1/9/1951 as a Peon and subsequently he was promoted to the post of Head Peon. In the year 1981 he was working as Head Peon and at that time the petitioner received repeated complaints regarding the misbehaviour of the respondent with the clients of the bank, its officers and the other members of the office staff. In view thereof, the petitioner served the respondent with a charge-sheet and after detailed inquiry into the acts of misconduct of the respondent, he was discharged from service with effect from 22/05/1984. 2. 2. THE action of the petitioner discharging the respondent from service was challenged by him in the Court of the learned Civil Judge [j. D. ] at Anjar by instituting Civil Suit being Civil suit No. 89 of 1984. The said suit came to be dismissed, against which the respondent preferred Civil Appeal No. 11 of 1987 before the District Court, Kutch at Bhuj. The said appeal was partly allowed. Though the District Court directed reinstatement of the respondent, it denied the backwages. It also directed the petitioner bank to hold inquiry afresh. Hence, Second Appeal No. 139 of 1989 was preferred by respondent before this Court wherein this Court [coram : S. K. Keshote, J. ] awarded 75% back wages from the date of filing of the suit and not from the date of discharge. 2. 3. AFTER the aforesaid proceedings, the departmental inquiry was started once again on the same charges referred to hereinabove. The Inquiry officer recorded his findings on 2/06/1990 and found the respondent guilty of charges nos. 1 and 2. The said officer, however, did not find that the respondents behaviour was riotous. The Inquiry Officer also found the respondent guilty of other charges, namely charge nos. 3, 5 and 7, but he did not find the respondent guilty of charge nos. 4 and 6. Acting on the basis of the said findings of the Inquiry officer, the Disciplinary Authority again issued show cause notice dated 7/02/1991 calling upon the respondent to show cause why the punishment of dismissal should not be imposed upon him. The petitioner submitted his reply to the said show cause notice on 18th March, 1991 wherein he gave detailed explanation to the charges held to be proved against him. He also requested the Disciplinary Authority that even if the charges are held proved, considering the nature of the said charges, punishment of dismissal contemplated by Disciplinary Authority was very harsh and the Authority should take lenient view in the matter. On the basis of the submissions made in the said explanation, the respondent requested the Authority to quash the notice issued against him. 2. 4. THE Disciplinary Authority by taking into consideration the entire record placed before it with regard to the inquiry held against the respondent including his explanation submitted in response to the show cause notice dated 7/02/1991 issued by the Authority and after detailed consideration of all the relevant facts, the provisions of the bank rules and regulations and all other aspects concerning the issues, came to th










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