The present application has been filed under sec. 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 for condonation of delay of 51 days caused in filing the First Appeal on the grounds stated in the application, inter alia, that the local advocate had addressed the letter informing him about the dismissal of the suit and thereafter it was sent to the Dy. Executive Engineer who consulted the Executive Engineer and after consulting the advocate the appeal was preferred which consumed time resulting in delay of 51 days.

2. Heard learned advocate Mr. H.S. Munshaw for the applicants-panchayat and learned advocate Mr. S.M. Shah for respondent No.1-contractor as well as for respondents Nos. 2, 4 & 6.

3. Learned advocate Mr. Munshaw submitted that the panchayat is a local body which has to follow the procedure and it takes sometime in moving the files for administrative reasons. He submitted that the Hon'ble Apex Court has made observations with regard to adopting a liberal approach in such matters of condonation of delay particularly when it is a Government organisation or body. He has referred to and relied upon the judgments in the case of State (NCT of Delhi) v. Ahmed Jaan, reported in AIR 2009 SC (Supp) 695 as well as in the case of State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani and ors., reported in AIR 1996 SC 162 . He emphasised the observation,

“When the State is an applicant, praying for condonation of delay, it is common knowledge that on account of impersonal machinery and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-making, file-pushing, and passing-on-the buck ethos, delay on the part of the State is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve, but the State represents collective cause of the community. It is axiomatic that decisions are taken by officers/agencies proverbially at slow pace and encumbered process of pushing the files from table to table and keeping it on table for considerable time causing delay intentional or otherwise is a routine. Considerable delay of procedural red tape in the process of their making decision is a common feature. Therefore, certain amount of latitude is not impermissible. If the appeals brought by the State are lost for such default no person is individually affected but what in the ultimate analysis suffers, is public interest. The expression "sufficient cause" should, therefore, be considered with pragmatism in justice-oriented approach rather than the technical detection of sufficient cause for explaining every day's delay. The factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the Governmental conditions would be cognizant to and require adoption of pragmatic approach in justice-oriented process. The Court should decide the matters on merits unless the case is hopelessly without merit.”

4. Learned advocate Mr. S.M. Shah for the respondents vehemently opposed the application for condonation of delay contending that the delay is required to be explained with sufficient cause and it may not be assumed. He submitted that at least some reasonable explanation must come forth which is not available in the present case. Learned advocate Mr. Shah submitted that in absence of any explanation or sufficient cause the delay may not be condoned. He submitted that the Limitation Act which is a statutory provision cannot be ignored and discretion may not be exercised contrary to the provisions of law.

5. In support of his submissions, learned advocate Mr. Shah has referred to and relied upon the judgment of the Full Bench of this Court in the case of Municipal Corporation of Ahmedabad v. Voltas Ltd., reported in 1994 (2) GLR 1325, and submitted and emphasised,

“Delay must be explained and established – Government departments and statutory bodies cannot claim for condonation of delay on grounds of administrative follow up delays.”

Therefore, learned advocate Mr. Shah submitted that for application of law every litigant stands on the same footing and there cannot be any differ