Key Points: - The starting point of limitation for filing a restoration application under Order XXI Rule 106(3) is the date of the order dismissing the execution petition for default, not the knowledge of the order (knowledge presumed where represented by advocate) (!) (!) . - An application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not maintainable in proceedings arising under Order XXI CPC, and the court cannot rely on inherent powers to condone delay in such proceedings (!) (!) (!) . - If the execution petition was dismissed for default, the restoration application must be filed within 30 days from the date of that order, and knowledge of dismissal is irrelevant for starting period (!) (!) . - The Kerala amendment prescribing Section 5 applicability in Order XXI became inapplicable after the Limitation Act, 1963; thus, no Section 5 bar in such proceedings (!) . - The court cannot exercise inherent power to condone delay where there is an express statutory provision governing limitation in Order XXI; reliance on inherent powers is inappropriate (no condonation via Section 151 where Section 5 is inapplicable) (!) (!) . - The judgment discusses that the decision aligns with prior interpretations rejecting application of Section 5 to Order XXI proceedings and clarifies the starting point for restoration petitions (!) (!) . - The appellate court set aside the impugned judgment and allowed the appeal (appeal allowed) (!) (!) .

What is the effect of Rule 106(3) of Order XXI CPC on the time limit for filing a restoration application when an execution petition is dismissed for default?

What is the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to restoration applications under Order XXI CPC, and can the court invoke inherent powers to condone delay?

What is the starting point for limitation for restoration when an order under Rule 105(2) or ex-parte under Rule 105(3) is passed, and does knowledge of dismissal affect it?