J.B. Pardiwala, J.

1. This matter was mentioned by Mr. Hiren Vyas, the learned counsel, whose appearance is shown on behalf of the complainant. Mr. Vyas pointed out that he is no longer appearing on behalf of the complainant. The complainant has been informed about the same long time back. It appears that the complainant has not taken any steps to engage any other lawyer to oppose this application.

2. By this application under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the applicant-original accused seeks to invoke the inherent powers of this Court praying for quashing of the proceedings of the Criminal Case No.299 of 2015 filed in the court of the learned JMFC, Dasada, District: Surendranagar for the offence punishable under section 138 of the N.I. Act. The following facts are not in dispute:

(i) The cheque is dated 10th May, 2015

(ii) The same came to be dishonoured on 13th May, 2015.

(iii) The statutory notice under section 138 of the N.I. Act came to be issued on 25th May, 2015.

(iv) The notice was served upon the applicant herein on 30th May, 2015.

(v) The period of 15 days expired on 14th June, 2015.

(vi) The period of 30 days started reckoning from 15th June, 2015.

(vii) The 30th day expired on 15th July, 2015.

(viii) The complaint ought to have been filed on or before 15th July, 2015.

3. However, it appears that the complaint was filed on 16th July, 2015. The verification of the complainant was also recorded on 15th July, 2015 and process was ordered to be issued.

4. The principal argument of the learned counsel appearing for the applicant is that the complaint in question is time barred. The Court ought not to have taken cognizance on a time barred complaint. In support of such submission, the learned counsel has placed reliance on the following decisions;

(i) In the case of Umiya Pipe Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Gujarat & Anr., 2009(1) GLR 312;

(ii) A decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of D. Babu v. Bhartia Industries Ltd., 2009 (II) DCR 634;

(iii) A decision of the Madras High Court in the case of C.K. Mahalingam v. R. Palanisamy, 2009 (3) BC 631;

(iv) A decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Ramdas P. Naik v. P. Kumaran, 2010 (1) BC 361;

5. The decision of this Court in the case of Umiya Pipe Pvt. Ltd. (supra) is sufficient to decide this matter.

6. In the said judgment, a learned Single Judge of this Court considered an identical issue and observed in paras- 9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16 and 17 as under;

"9. The question, which is posed for consideration of this Court, is whether the impugned complaint made by respondent no.2-original complainant against the applicants-original accused is within the stipulated time/period of limitation as contemplated under Section 142 read with Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.

10. It is the contention on behalf of the applicants-original accused that the complaint for the offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 is required to be made by respondent no. 2-original complainant within one month of the date on which the cause of action arises under Clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138, i.e., immediately, after fifteenth day of receipt of the notice by applicants-original accused under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and, thereafter within one month. Thus, it is the case on behalf of the applicants-original accused that in the present case, notice issued, by respondent no. 2-original complainant under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, was received by the applicants original accused on 22/12/2006 and giving fifteen days time as contemplated under Sub-Clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138, the complaint was required to be made within a period of thirty days from 06/01/2007, i.e., on or before 06/02/2007 and in the present case, complaint has been made on 09/02/2007.

11. On the other hand, it is the contention on behalf of respondent no. 2-original complainant that the limitation to make the com