Point of Law: To employ workmen as “badlis”, casuals or temporaries and to continue them as such for years, with the object of depriving them of the status and privileges of permanent workmen.”

JUDGMENT :

1. The present petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been filed by the petitioner for quashing and setting aside the impugned award dated 28.06.2007 passed by the Labour Court, Palanpur in Reference (LCP) No.259/1996, whereby the claim put up by the petitioner has been rejected.

2. For the sake of brevity and convenience, the parties are referred to as the “workman” and “employer” respectively.

3. It is the case of the workman that he was appointed as driver for 29 days on 16.08.1988 and he has continuously worked for more than 240 days till his service is terminated by oral order. It is further the case of the workman that on 17.07.1990, he was got transferred order to Deesa. That he reported for work at Deesa on 18.07.1990, however, he was told by the employer that they have to inquire from their head office and they did not permit the workman to report. It is also contended by the workman that during the period from 22.07.1990 to 17.02.1991, he met with a minor accident and also fell sick and, therefore, could not report for work. According to him, on 18.02.1991, he reported for work along with the certificate of the Doctor, but, he was not allowed to do so and the same reply was given to him. It is also contended by the workman that his service has been illegally terminated and, therefore, he moved an application on 30.04.1991 to the Commissioner of Labour which made a reference in 1991. It is further contended by the workman that initially, the reference was made to the Labour Court, Ahmedabad where it was registered as Reference (LCA) No.2294/1991 and after establishment of Labour Court at Palanpur, it was renumbered as Reference (LCP) No.259/1996. It is contended by the workman that after hearing both the sides, the Labour Court has passed the impugned award and has ignored all relevant and material documents and did not appreciate oral as well as documentary evidence and ultimately, rejected the reference. According to the workman, he has proved the fact that he has worked for more than 240 days prior to his termination of service. He has also referred to that from 16.07.1989 to 16.07.1990, he has worked for 348 days as he has completed 240 days without artificial break. It is contended by the workman that though the employer has also issued certificate to that effect, the same has not been considered by the Labour Court. It is further contended by the workman that the employer has also appointed other driver, who was junior to him namely Pinakin and others and, therefore, there is clear breach of Section 25(F) and (G) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter be referred to as the “I.D. Act”). According to him, all these facts have not been controverted by the employer and the Labour Court has erroneously rejected the claim.

4. The affidavit-in-reply has been filed on behalf of the employer wherein it is categorically stated that the workman has failed to prove the fact that he has worked for 240 days during the period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of his alleged termination. It is further stated in the affidavit-in-reply that the workman was not terminated by the employer, but the workman abandoned the service and did not report for duty at the transfer place at Deesa. It is further stated that the medical certificate produced by the workman is not genuine. It is also stated that there is no breach of any of the provisions of the I.D. Act as alleged. It is stated that there was no pleadings before the Labour Court regarding resorting to unfair labour practice. It is stated that the workman has accepted the fixed term of 29 days appointment order. It is further stated that the appointment of Pinakin was on regular post and he was appointed in accordance with law after following due process of selection. It is further stated in the affidavit-in-reply that the Labour Court has not committed any serious error of facts and law in rejecting the reference.

5. Heard Mr.D. S. Vas