JUDGMENT

S.G. SHAH, J.: -

1. Rule. Mr. Manan Mehta, learned Additional Public Prosecutor waives service of notice of rule for Respondent No.1 - State of Gujarat as well as Mr. Nikul K. Soni, learned -advocate waives service of notice of Rule for Respondent No.2.

2. Heard learned advocates for the respective parties. Perused the record.

3. The petitioner is original accused in Criminal Case No.756 of 2006 preferred by respondent no.2 under Section 138 of Negotiable Instrument Act, wherein, petitioner has been convicted and ordered to undergo imprisonment of 1 year with a direction to pay Rs.10,00,000/- being amount of cheque as compensation to the complainant. When such order of conviction was challenged in Criminal Appeal No.25 of 2012, by impugned judgment and order dated 24.4.2015, the Sessions Court of Vadodara has confirmed the judgment of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Vadodara by rejecting the appeal. While challenging such impugned judgment in filing Revision Petition, there is delay of 281 days and, therefore, petitioner has filed this application to condone such delay. The application has been opposed by the respondent. Whereas, it is contended by the petitioner that when appeal was heard, practically, their advocate could not remain present which is in-fact recorded by the -Sessions Judge in Paragraph 6 of the impugned judgment where it is stated that the learned advocate for the appellant has consistently remained absent and hence stage of argument of the appellant was closed. Thereafter, applicant has applied for certified copies and preferred this application praying to condone the delay.

4. The respondent is relying upon the judgment in the case of Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corporation of Brihan reported in 2012 (5) SCC 157. Whereas, petitioner is relying upon the judgment in the case of National Small Industries Corporation Limited v. State (NCT of Delhi) reported in 2009 (1) SCC 407 so also 2009 Cri. L. J. 3777 between Sanjay Mishra v. Ms. Kanishka Kapoor. However, at present, we are concerned with the main issue of delay only that whether delay can be condoned or not.

5. Therefore when there is certainly sufficient cause for the petitioner in not challenging the order of warrant referred herein above and therefore there is reason to condone the delay.

6. The petitioner is relying upon several decisions submitting that the law of Limitation is well settled which confirms that no one should be non-suited on technical grounds.

7. Generally Courts should be reluctant to shut out a consideration of the case on merits on the grounds of limitation or any other similar technicality (AIR 2012 SC 640 - Abdul Gafoor Vs. State of Bihar); if there is delay in filing petition, due to opinion of the advocate on record and the Solicitor General etc., such delay deserves to be condoned (AIR 2011 SC 428 Delhi Development Authority Vs.Bhola Nath Sharma); there is a strong arguable case on behalf of the appellant and, therefore, the Court should decide the matter on merit by giving the expression sufficient cause a pragmatic justiceoriented approach (AIR 2011 SC 977 Union of India Vs.Giani); the meaning of the word sufficient is adequate or enough, inasmuch as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended and, therefore, word sufficient embraces no more than that which provides a platitude which when the act done suffices to accomplish the purpose. Sufficient cause is a question of - fact and the Court has to exercise its discretion in the varied and special circumstances in the case at hand. There cannot be a straitjacket formula of universal application (AIR 2011 SC 1150 Parimal Vs.Veena); if case file has to be routed from various departments before decision to file appeal, it is sufficient cause for condonation of delay (AIR 2010 SC 1445 State of J & K Vs.Mohmad Maqbool Sofi); while deciding application for condonation of delay, Court cannot go into the merits of the case, if averments made in the application is sufficient to co