The duty of the Family Court to make efforts for settlement under Section 9 of the Family Courts Act, 1984, and the importance of compliance with consent terms in divorce proceedings.

ORDER :

(N.V. Anjaria, J.)

Heard learned senior advocate Mr.Percy Kavina with learned advocate Mr. S.J. Adeshra for the appellant and learned advocate Mr.Bhavin Satwara for the respondent.

2. This First Appeal arose from order dated 17.10.2022 passed by the Principal Judge, Family Court, Ahmedabad below Exhibit 1 in Family Suit No.1922 of 2019. It was the proceedings instituted by the petitioner Husband before the Family Court for obtaining decree of divorce under Section 13(1) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.

3. It appears that in the said proceedings, the parties filed consent terms before the Family Court. In the said consent terms, the parties inter alia agreed for mutual separation by way of divorce and also decided in respect of the amount of permanent alimony to be given to the wife.

3.1 The Family Court however refused to accept the consent terms, further rejecting the prayers of the parties to grant relief in terms of consent by passing decree for dissolution of marriage.

3.2 The Family Court in its order recorded as under,

“At this juncture, unless and until, all the terms and conditions, which have been agreed upon by and between the parties in the Consent Terms are fulfilled by the both the parties, this Court cannot grant the relief of dissolution of marriage by passing a decree of divorce on the basis of the terms and conditions arrived at by and between the parties in their Consent Terms at Exh-24.”

3.3 While passing the above order and refusing to accede to the consent terms of the parties, the Family Court inter alia proceeded to observe in para 8, which reason appears to have been weighed with the Family Court for passing the impugned order.

“8. Its to be noted that in the present case on hand, as per the terms and conditions of the para 3 (d) and (e); the petitioner shall have to pay to the respondent a sum of Rs.55,00,000/- (Rupees Fifty Five Lakh Only) towards her present and future maintenance and permanent alimony and all other financial claims including personal articles, belonging and home items as well as previous financial transactions, and for that the petitioner shall prepare a draft of the said amount and handover the same to the Nazir of the Principal Family Judge at Ahmedabad for safe custody at the time of filing of the present consent terms in Family Suit No. 1922 of 2019 and such draft will be handed over to the respondent after the passing of the decree in present proceedings i.e. Family Suit No. 1922 of 2019”

3.4 On 2.11.2022, when the appeal came up for consideration, the court inter alia observed in its order that if the parties were desirous to move Family Court concerned since there was inclination to deposit the entire amount by way of demand draft and for that other side had no objection, the parties were permitted to approach the Family Court.

3.5 Thereafter, on 8.11.2022, this court passed the following order,

“The appellant- husband Wing Commander Abhishek Singh Tanwar filed Family Suit No.1922 of 2019 for decree of divorce under Section 13(1) of the Hindu Marriage Act. In the said proceedings, it appears that the parties negotiated for settlement which culminated into drawing of consent terms dated 1.10.2022. The consent terms figures on record of this appeal (Annexure C, page 24).

2. The consent terms were submitted before the Family Court. The Family Court passed order below Exhibit 1 dated 17.10.2022. The said order reads as under in its operative part.

“At this juncture, unless and until, all the terms and conditions, which have been agreed upon by and between the parties in the Consent Terms are fulfilled by the both the parties, this Court cannot grant the relief of dissolution of marriage by passing a decree of divorce on the basis of the terms and conditions arrived at by and between the parties in their Consent Terms at Exhibit-24.”

3. It is against the aforesaid order that the present appeal is directed. When the appeal came up for the first time for consideration before the court, thi