An industrial dispute must be actively pursued; significant delays in raising disputes can render them non-existent, impacting the ability to seek relief.

ORDER :

1. The present appeal filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent, 1865 is directed against the judgment and order dated 09.10.2018 passed by the learned Single Judge in the captioned writ petition, whereby the learned Single Judge has allowed the writ petition and set aside the award dated 12.06.2014 passed by the Labour Court, Rajkot in Reference (LCR) No. 126 of 2008, wherein the Labour Court partly allowed the reference with the direction to the employer to reinstate the workman i.e. the present appellant without continuity of service however, without back wages.

2. It is the case of the appellant that he was illegally terminated on 31.03.1999. It is also not in dispute that he raised an industrial dispute with regard to his termination in the year 2008, which culminated into the Reference (LCR) No. 126 of 2008.

3. Before the Labour Court, it was contended that he was working as a Clerk and appointed in the year 1983 and he worked regularly till 31.03.1999. A specific contention was raised by the respondent-State authorities that there has been delay in raising the industrial dispute however, the Labour Court has allowed the reference proceedings by observing that the termination of the appellant-workman was in violation of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (the I.D. Act).

4. The learned Single Judge, after placing reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Prabhakar Vs. Joint Director Sericulture Department and other, 2015 (10) Scale 114, has recorded as under:

“12. In this context, a profitable reference can be had at this stage to the observations by Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Prabhakar v. Joint Director Sericulture Department & Ors. 2015 (10) Scale 114, wherein Hon’ble Apex Court observed, inter alia, that:

“8. From the facts narrated above, it becomes clear that for a period of fourteen years no grievance was made by the petitioner qua his alleged termination. Though it was averted that the petitioner had approached the Management time and again and was given assurance that he would be taken back in service. There is nothing on record to substantiate this. No notice was served upon the Management. There is no assurance given in writing by the Management at any point of time. Such assertions are clearly self serving. Pertinently, even the Labour Court has not accepted the aforesaid explanation anywhere and has gone by the fact that the dispute was raised after a delay of fourteen years. Therefore, keeping in mind the aforesaid facts, we would decide the issue which has arisen, namely, whether reference of such a belated claim was appropriate.

9. It may be stated that the question is of utmost importance as it is seen that many times, as in the instant case, the workers raise dispute after a number of years of the cause of action. Whether the dispute can still be treated as surviving? Or whether it can be said that the dispute does not exist when the workmen concerned after their say termination kept quiet for a number of years and thus acquiesced into the action?

20. At this stage, it may be pointed out that admittedly the law of limitation does not apply to industrial disputes. The Limitation Act does not apply to the proceedings under the Industrial Disputes Act and under the Industrial Disputes Act no period of limitation is prescribed. This is now well settled by a series of judgments of this Court.

21. On the reading of these judgments, which are discussed hereinafter, it can be discerned that in some decisions where the reference was made after a lapse of considerable period, the Court did not set aside the reference but moulded the relief by either granting reinstatement but denying back wages, fully or partially, or else granted compensation, denying reinstatement. On the other hand, in some of the decisions, the Court held that even when there was no time prescribed to exercise power under Section 10 of the Act, such a power could not be exercised at any point of time to revi