Advocates:
Advocate Appeared:
For the Appellants : DHRUV H. PANCHAL, SNEHA A. JOSHI
For the Respondent: UMARFARUK M. KHARADI

The legal judgment clearly establishes that the primary ground for eviction in this case is the tenant's acquisition of suitable alternative accommodation, which is a relevant and decisive factor under the applicable Rent Act provisions. The courts rightly focused on whether the tenant had acquired such accommodation, and it was conclusively proved that she had purchased and constructed a house with amenities, deemed suitable for her needs (!) (!) (!) .

Furthermore, the principle of greater hardship, which is relevant only when eviction is sought on the grounds of personal requirement under section 13(1)(g), is not applicable in this scenario since the landlord's eviction ground is based on section 13(1)(l), relating to the tenant's acquisition of alternative residence (!) (!) .

The legal framework emphasizes that the act of acquiring or building a suitable residence by the tenant automatically triggers the landlord's right to recover possession, without the necessity to consider the tenant's hardship or inconvenience (!) (!) . The evidence on record supports that the tenant's alternative accommodation is suitable and has been acquired by her own right, which satisfies the legal requirements for eviction under the relevant section (!) (!) (!) .

The argument that the tenant suffers greater hardship by being evicted from her existing residence is not legally relevant in this context, given the statutory provisions and the evidence demonstrating her acquisition of suitable alternative accommodation (!) (!) .

In conclusion, the courts below correctly applied the law, focusing on the critical fact that the tenant had obtained suitable accommodation, which legally mandates eviction. The concurrent findings are supported by substantial evidence, and the scope for judicial interference is limited. Therefore, the revision application lacks merit and is rightly dismissed (!) (!) .