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2009 Supreme(Gau) 871

IN THE HIGH COURT OF GAUHATI
Iqbal Ahmed Ansari, J.
Sati Oil Udyog Ltd. and Anr. - Appellants
Vs.
Avanti Projects and Infrastructure Ltd. - Respondent
Decided On : 07.12.2009

Headnote:

Constitution of India, 1950 – Article 226 - Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 - Section125 - Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Section 94 and 141 - Order XXXIX, IX , XXI , Rule 2 , 9 , 7 , 13 , 89, 90, 91, 97, 99 and 100 , - Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - Section 9 , 28 , 37(1)(a) and 21 - Companies Act, 1956 - Specific Relief Act, 1963 - Section 10 ,20 , 41 - Transfer of Property of Act - Section 3 and 5 - General Clauses Act - English Arbitration Act, 1996 - Section 48(5)(b) - Contract Act - Section 73 - Joint venture agreement - Suit land - Physical possession - Appellants approached respondent to enter into a joint venture agreement with respondent on basis of their representation that appellants were joint owners of suit land they had been in actual physical possession of suit land some portions of suit land were under possession of a third party who has a small marble godown under appellants but is willing to vacate same and handover possession thereof to appellants - Respondent has taken a decision to develop suit land into a multi-purpose complex by way of joint venture agreement as aforesaid - By means of four cheques applicant-respondent in discharge of its obligation under term sheet dated paid rupees twenty lakh in favour of present appellants as part payment of security deposit - Payment so made was acknowledged by appellants – Held, learned court below ought to have ascertained if contract is specifically enforceable - When Section 41(e) makes granting of injunction in respect of a contract subject to such contract being specifically enforceable learned court below ought to have made some attempts to determine before passing impugned order if contract as presented by term sheet and MoU was specifically enforceable - No attempt in this regard was made by learned court below - In fact, it appears that it has completely escaped attention of the learned court below that since subject-matter of application, made under Section 9 by the respondent, related to performance of a contract it is duty of court before it grants injunction to determine if contract is specifically enforceable or not - If contract is not performable, granting of injunction is per se illegal unless case falls under Section 42 of Specific Relief Act - Present case does not however fall within ambit of Section 42 - Situated thus one has no option but to hold and Court do hold that respondent had not been able to make out any prima facie case for granting of injunction - When injunction cannot be granted and when disputes remain alive only for purpose of determination of liabilities question of appointment of receiver to manage suit property or question of granting injunction until appointment of receiver also does not arise at all - Application made by respondent under Section 9 was thus wholly misconceived and not tenable in law - Appeal allowed.

JUDGMENT

I.A. Ansari, J.

1. This is an appeal under Section 37(1)(a) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 ('the Act of 1996') against the order, dated 24.2.2009, passed, in Misc. (Arbitration) Case No. 103/2009, by the learned District Judge, Kamrup.

2. The material facts and various stages, which have given rise to the present appeal, may, in brief, be set out as under:

(i) The applicant-respondent heroin, which is a company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956, filed an application under Section 9 of the Act of 1996, the case of the applicant-respondent being, in brief, thus:

(a) The opposite party, (i.e., the appellants herein) are companies, registered under the Companies Act. The appellants approached the respondent to enter into a joint venture agreement with the respondent on the basis of their representation that the appellants were joint owners of the suit land, they had been in actual physical possession of suit land, some portions of the suit land were under the possession of a third party, who has a small marble godown under the appellants, but is willing to vacate the same and handover the possession thereof to the appellants. The respondent has taken a decision to develop the suit land into a multi-purpose complex by way of joint venture agreement as aforesaid. In this joint venture, the share of the appellants would be 45% of the constructed area and the sole obligation and responsibility of the appellants would be to give vacant possession of the suit land to the respondent for the purpose of construction thereon. A concluded contract, thus, came into existence between the respondent and the present appellants. On 15.6.2006, the respondent, on the one hand, as developer, and one Mr P.D. Deorah, the common director of the two appellant-companies, as owner, executed an agreement, in writing, in the form of term sheet, whereby and where under the parties had finalised the broad terms and conditions of the joint venture for construction of multipurpose complex on the suit land. By means of four cheques, applicant-respondent, in discharge of its obligation under the term sheet, dated 15.6.2006, paid rupees twenty lakh in favour of the present appellants as part payment of the security deposit. The payment, so made, was acknowledged by the appellants. On 15.6.2006, the respondent also paid a further sum of rupees five lakh, by two cheques, in favour of the appellants, towards part payment of cost for obtaining sanction in terms of the agreement. In or about first week of December 2007, the respondent was informed by the appellants that Guwahati Metropolitan Development Authority had issued no objection certificate to the appellants for construction over the suit land. Soon after issuance of the NOC, appellant No. 2, under its letter, dated 4.10.2008, requested the respondent to make further disbursement of a sum of rupees fifteen lakh as shifting charges with a request to transmit the same to their bank account. Pursuant to such instructions given by the appellants, the respondent paid a sum of rupees fifteen lakh to the appellants by way of a cheque on 8.1.2008. On 4.3.2008, a Memorandum of Understanding ('MoU') was signed between the parties concerned, whereunder the appellants acknowledged the payment received from the respondent under the agreement, dated 15.6.2008, and also agreed to take necessary steps for removal of the said marble godown. The appellants also, in terms of the MoU, were to get removed and vacated 7/8 sheds standing on the Zoo Road, which fall outside the suit land.

(b) By a facsimile message, dated 1.7.2008, the appellants demanded a sum of rupees twenty-one lakh from the respondent on the ground that the occupants of the suit land had agreed to vacate the occupied portion of the suit land in favour of the appellants for consideration of rupees twenty-one lakh. Believing in the representation so made, the respondent forwarded a cheque of rupees twenty-one lakh under a covered letter,










































































































































































































































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