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2006 Supreme(Gau) 961
IN THE HIGH COURT OF GAUHATI
Iqbal Ahmed Ansari, J.
Indu Bhusan Dey and Ors. – Appellants
Vs.
Anita Paul – Respondent
Decided On: 02.11.2006
A contract of personal service cannot be specifically enforced under the Specific Relief Act, except in specific exceptions such as government servants, industrial or labor laws, or breach of statutory obligations by a statutory body.
Headnote:
Specific Relief Act - Employment Contract - Section 14, Section 41(e)
Fact of the Case:
The teachers of a school admitted their children in different English Medium Schools contrary to the school's condition of employment. The school management issued notices terminating their services, leading to civil suits and injunction applications.
Finding of the Court:
The court found that the relationship between the teachers and the school was that of master and servant, and the termination of their employment did not entitle them to a declaration that their employment had not been validly terminated. The court also emphasized that a contract of personal service cannot be specifically enforced, except in specific exceptions.
Issues: The main issue was whether the court could grant injunction to prevent breach of a contract of personal service, and whether the suit was maintainable.
Ratio Decidendi: The court held that under the Specific Relief Act, a contract of personal service cannot be specifically enforced, except in specific exceptions such as government servants, industrial or labor laws, or breach of statutory obligations by a statutory body. The court emphasized that the remedy for an employee, not falling within the exceptions, lies in suing the employer for damages.
Final Decision: The court set aside the injunction orders and the orders passed by the trial court, and directed the plaintiff-opposite party to remain at liberty to sue the defendant-petitioners for damages.
I.A. Ansari, J.
1. By this common judgment and order, I propose to dispose of all the five civil revision petitions, for, all of them involve identical facts and questions of law and, as has been sought for and agreed to by the learned Counsel for the parties, all the civil revisions have been heard together.
2. I have heard Mr. N. Choudhury, learned Counsel for the petitioners, and Mr. N. Dhar, learned Counsel for the opposite party.
3. Put in a narrow compass, the facts leading to the present set of revision petitions may, in brief, be set out as under:
(i) The opposite party herein were all teachers of South Point School, at Silchar, which the present petitioners represent. According to the school management, the appointment of these teachers was subject to a condition that they cannot admit their child in any English Medium School, in the city, unless such admission is refused by the South Point School. Contrary to this condition, which, according to the school management, all the teachers were bound to follow, the present set of teachers admitted their children in different English Medium Schools. Notices were accordingly issued, on 4.5.2005, by the management of the said School informing them that their services would stand terminated with effect from 3.6.2005. This notice was, thus, a notice informing the petitioners that their services would stand terminated on expiry of one month from the date of service of the notice. These teachers, as plaintiffs, then, instituted Title Suit Nos. 55/2005, 56/2005, 57/2007, 58/2005 and 59/2005 in the court of the Civil Judge (Sr. Divn.) No. 1, Silchar, seeking decree for declaration, inter alia, that the notice of termination, dated 4.5.2005, was unjust, improper, unfair, illegal, mala fide, unlawful, inapplicable and not binding upon the parties and that the plaintiffs are not legally bound by any terms and conditions of appointment as contended in the notices aforementioned, for, the said condition of appointment, even if true, is illegal, arbitrary, improper, unjust and against the public policy. The plaintiffs also filed applications, under Order XXXIX, Rules 1 and 2 read with Section 151 CPC, seeking temporary injunction restraining the defendants, i.e., the petitioners herein, from terminating the services of the plaintiffs by giving effect to the notices, dated 4.5.2005, aforementioned till disposal of the suit.
(ii) These applications for temporary injunction gave rise to Misc. Case Nos. 21/2005, 22/2005, 23/2005, 24/2005 and 25/2005. By orders, dated 16.5.2005, passed, in the said miscellaneous cases, learned trial court directed status quo to be maintained by the parties in respect of the subject of dispute until further order. After having received objection against the prayer for temporary injunction, the learned court below heard the learned Counsel for the parties and passed orders, on 30.6.2005, making thereby the orders passed, on 16.5.2005, absolute till disposal of the suit. Aggrieved by the order, dated 30.6.2005, aforementioned, the present petitioners, who were defendants in the suit, preferred appeals. By orders, dated 29.4.2006, passed, in Misc. Appeal Nos. 05/2005, 06/2005, 07/2005, 08/2005 and 09/2005, learned District Judge, Cachar, Silchar, refused to interfere with the order of injunction already granted. It is in these circumstances that the defendants have come to this Court with the help of the present revision petitions.
4. Before proceeding further, it needs to be noted that while it is contended, on behalf of the defendant-petitioners, that granting of injunction in the present case is barred by Section 14 read with Section 41(e) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, the opposite party, as plaintiffs in the suit, contend that their suit is maintainable and if injunction was not granted, it would have frustrated the suit. In such circumstances, according to the plaintiff-opposite party, the learned courts below committed no error in restraining the mana
