The main legal point established is that while a private school may discharge public duties, specific actions such as discontinuation of services, governed by ordinary contracts of service and not statutory provisions, may not be amenable to challenge under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

JUDGMENT :

Heard Mr. S Borthakur, learned counsel for the petitioner. Also heard Mr. B Kaushik, learned counsel for the respondents in the Secondary Education Department, Government of Assam as well as Mr. A Dhar, learned counsel for the authorities under the Montfort School, Chabua.

2. The petitioner is a teacher in the Montfort High School at Chabua in the Dibrugarh district and is aggrieved by a communication dated 04.04.2022 from the authorities in the Montfort High School by which the petitioner was discontinued as a teacher of the school concerned. In the communication dated 04.04.2022 certain reasons thereof have been stated as to why the petitioner has been discontinued. When the writ petition was moved on 13.05.2022, the petitioner took a stand that although the Montfort High School is a privately managed high school, but they are governed by the provisions of Assam Non-Government Educational Institution (Regulation and Management) Act, 2006 (for short, the Act of 2006). Accordingly, in the order dated 13.05.2022 in WP(C) No.3111/2022 it was taken note that although three reasons have been stated in the communication dated 04.04.2022 and the communication also refers to certain show cause notices, but the show cause notices did not pertain to the allegations referred in the order of discontinuing the services of the petitioner and on the other hand, they were related to some other incidents. It was further taken note that under Section 15(2) of the Act of 2006, which according to the petitioner was applicable in the facts and circumstances of the present case, there is also a requirement of providing a reasonable opportunity of being heard before an employee of a non-governmental educational institution can be dismissed, removed or reduced in rank and accordingly a prima facie view was formed that there was an aberration of the requirement of Section 15(2) of the Act of 2006.

3. Objections were raised by Mr. SMT Chistie, learned counsel for the respondents in the Secondary Education Department of the Government of Assam that the respondent institution being a private institute, a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution of India would not be maintainable. But, however, Mr. S. Borthakur, learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon two pronouncements of the Hon’ble Supreme Court rendered in Marwari Balika Vidyalaya Vs. Asha Srivastava and Others, reported in (2020) 14 SCC 449 and Ramesh Ahluwalia Vs. State of Punjab and Ors. reported in (2012) 12 SCC 331, wherein it has been held that a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India would also be maintainable against a private un-aided educational institution. Accordingly, considering the nature of the prima facie case made regarding not following the provisions of Section 15(2) of the Act of 2006 and also in view of the reliance of the petitioner upon the pronouncements of the Supreme Court in Marwari Balika Vidyalaya (supra) and Ramesh Ahluwalia (supra) which rebutted the objections raised by Mr. SMT Chistie, learned counsel for the Secondary Education Department, an interim order was passed providing that the communication dated 04.04.2022 shall remain stayed until further order(s).

4. In response thereof, the respondents in the Montfort High School have instituted IA(C)No.1580/2023 seeking for a recall of the interim order dated 13.05.2022 by raising the contention that under Section 2(xv) of the Act of 2006, an institute governed by Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India would not be included in the definition of a ‘non-government educational institution’ and, therefore, the provisions of the Act of 2006 would be inapplicable in respect of the respondent Montfort High School. It being inapplicable, it is the further contention that as the interim order was based upon non-compliance of Section 15(2) of the Act of 2006, therefore, the interim order requires a recall. Mr. S. Borthakur, learned counsel for the petitioner in response thereof relies up