Judicial consistency mandates that similar cases be treated alike, and a petitioner discharged on medical grounds should be recognized for benefits from the original appointment date if the discharge was not due to fault.

JUDGMENT& ORDER :

SUMAN SHYAM, J.

Heard Ms. K. Yadav, learned counsel appearing for the writ petitioner. Also heard Mr. H. Gupta, learned CGC appearing for the respondents.

2. It appears from the projections made by the writ petitioner that pursuant to a recruitment process undertaken by the Assam Rifles, the writ petitioner was appointed as ‘Washerman’ on 23-05-2001. However, the petitioner was discharged from service on 31- 01-2001 on medical ground. Being aggrieved by the said decision of discharging him form service, the petitioner had submitted a representation before the authorities to reconsider his case. However, when no favourable action was taken in the matter, the petitioner had approached this Court by filing W.P.(C) No. 3705/2005, which was disposed of with a direction upon the Director General of Assam Rifles to dispose of the representation dated 31-01-2004 submitted by the writ petitioner. However, not being satisfied with the consideration of his representation, the petitioner had once again approached this Court by filing W.P.(C) No. 774/2013, which was dismissed by the learned Single Judge along with several other similar writ petitions.

3. Thereafter, writ appeals were preferred by some aggrieved candidates against the order of the learned Single Judge. The writ appeals, along with several similar writ petitions including W.P.(C) No. 774/2013 preferred by the present petitioner was disposed of by the Division Bench of this Court vide order dated 26-10-2014. The operative part of the order dated 26-10-2014 is reproduced here-in-below:-

“15. In the result, the writ petitions as well as the appeals are allowed. The impugned order of the learned Single Judge, dated 03.12.2013, as well as the impugned order dated 27.12.2012, issued by the Deputy Commandant, Staff Officer-(I) (Recruitment) for Brigadier (Personnel), Assam Rifles are set aside. The respondents are directed to call the petitioners/ appellants, within a period of one month from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order, for undergoing the basic training. The petitioners/ appellants may obtain certified copy of this order and produce the same before the authorities concerned for doing the needful.”

4. Thereafter, the petitioner was subjected to another Medical Board, which had declared him medically fit. Consequently, he was taken back in service on 25-06-2015, i.e. after a lapse of nearly 14 years from the date of his initial appointment. Thereafter, the petitioner was also allowed to complete the basic training and on completion of such training, he has since been absorbed in the Assam Rifles on regular basis. The grievance of the petitioner is that instead of showing his initial date of appointment as 26-03-2001, the same has been recorded as 26-06-2014 and his age at the time of recruitment was recorded as 40 years. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner has approached this Court, for the third time, by filing the instant writ petition.

5. Ms. K. Yadav, learned counsel for the writ petitioner submits that the issue raised in the writ petition is squarely covered by several decision of this Court including the judgment and order dated 01-05-2024 passed by a coordinate Bench in W.P.(C) No. 7201/2018 (Prabhu Dayal Vs. UoI & Ors.) wherein, the learned Single Judge, after examining the plea raised by the similarly situated petitioners therein, seeking similar relief, had allowed the writ petition. Therefore, this writ petition be also allowed by this Court on same terms.

6. Mr. Gupta, learned CGC, on the other hand, has strongly opposed the submission of Ms. Yadav by contending that the facts of this case are distinguishable in as much as, in the case of Prabhu Dayal (Supra), the writ petitioner was already a recruitee meaning thereby that his discharge on medical ground was at a stage when he had partially undergone the basic training whereas in the present case, the petitioner was discharged from service on medical ground at the threshold, i.e. even