2026 Supreme(Gau) 585

THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT (HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH)
ANJAN MONI KALITA, J.
Ashok Doka and 2 ors. Son of Late Chapung Doka – Appellant
Versus
Lezen Gyadi and 9 Ors Son of Late Gagung Gyadi – Respondents
CRP 35 of 2025
Decided On : 19-03-2026

Appellate courts must not substitute their discretion for a trial court’s reasoned interim orders unless they are perverse or arbitrary. Pendency of contempt proceedings does not bar a trial court from granting a temporary injunction where clear prima facie evidence exists regarding the violation of an injunction.

Headnote:(A) Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Order 39 Rules 1, 2, and 2-A - Constitution of India - Article 227 - Scope of revisional and supervisory jurisdiction - Temporary injunction - Appellate interference - The trial court exercises discretion based on prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable injury - An appellate court should not substitute its own discretion for that of the trial court unless the exercise of such discretion by the trial court is shown to be perverse, arbitrary, capricious, or in disregard of settled legal principles. (Paras 17, 60, 61, and 63)

(B) Contempt of court - Pendency of contempt application under Order 39 Rule 2-A - Effect on grant of injunction - The pendency of a contempt proceeding for violation of an earlier court order does not operate as an automatic bar to the trial court granting a fresh temporary injunction to prevent the perpetuation of wrong and ensure justice - The inherent power of the court can be exercised to undo a wrong and protect the subject matter of the suit pending final adjudication. (Paras 58, 59, and 70)

Facts of the case:
A lawsuit was filed by the plaintiffs challenging the validity of an election conducted, allegedly in flagrant violation of a prior subsisting injunction order. The trial court granted a temporary injunction, observing that prima facie evidence showed the election process was tainted by non-compliance with judicial and administrative directives. The appellate court subsequently set aside the order on the premise that the question of violation of the previous order was a subject for separate contempt proceedings, and thus the trial court could not grant an injunction until such proceedings reached a conclusion.

Findings of Court:
The Court observed that the appellate court failed to identify any manifest perversity, legal error, or arbitrariness in the initial grant of the injunction. By merely substituting its own view without addressing the trial court’s reasoning regarding the golden principles of injunction, the appellate court exceeded its jurisdiction. The pendency of contempt proceedings is an independent matter and does not preclude a court from granting necessary interim relief to prevent unjust outcomes during the pendency of a substantive suit.

Issues: The main issues were whether an appellate court can interfere with an interim injunction based solely on the pendency of related contempt proceedings and the limitations on the appellate court's power to substitute its own discretion for the trial court’s discretionary interim rulings.

Ratio Decidendi: Appellate courts are restricted from interfering with the exercise of discretion by the court of first instance unless that discretion is legally flawed or perverse. Principles of temporary injunction are independent of contempt actions, and courts are duty-bound to prevent the perpetuation of illegal acts if evidence warrants prima facie intervention.

Result: Revision petition allowed; the appellate court’s order set aside and the trial court’s temporary injunction order restored.