The court emphasized the applicability of S.6 of the Limitation Act and the discretionary power of the Tribunal to condone the delay under the proviso to S.110A (3) of the Motor Vehicles Act.

Varghese Kalliaih, J.

This appeal raises a question of limitation. A minor, represented by the guardian, is the appellant. The minor filed an application before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal for compensation for the injuries he sustained in a motor accident. He was represented by his next friend/ guardian. Appellant claimed Rs.50,000/- as compensation for the injuries he sustained. The claim was made on different counts.

2. The Tribunal, after assessing the evidence in the case, determined the compensation payable to the appellant at Rs.20,000/-. But the Tribunal dismissed the application on the ground that the application was filed beyond the statutory period allowed for filing the claim petition. Before us, there is no serious controversy as to the reasonableness of the quantum of compensation.

3. Counsel for the appellant submitted that the Tribunal grievously erred in holding that the application has been filed out of time and that it is barred by limitation. S.110A(3) of the Motor Vehicles Act (hereinafter referred to as 'the act) mandates that an application for compensation arising out of an accident of the nature specified in sub-s.(1) of S.110 of the Act shall not be entertained unless it is made within six months of the occurrence of the accident. Further it is provided by the proviso that the Claims Tribunal may entertain the application after the expiry of the said period of six months, if it is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application in time. The accident happened on 18-8-1982. The application was filed only on 20-12-1984. Obviously, the application was filed after the time allowed by S.110A (3) of the Act. Taking stock of this situation, the Tribunal thought that the application deserves to be dismissed and so the Tribunal dismissed the application.

4. Counsel for the appellant submitted that the Tribunal did not consider the benign provisions contained in the Limitation Act, viz., S.29(2) and S.6 of the Limitation Act. The content and scope of those Sections have to be taken note of for giving substantial justice and relief to an injured minor in a motor accident. Counsel submitted that the scheme of the enactment, particularly the statutory provisions in that part of the Motor Vehicles Act which deals with compensation for injuries sustained in a motor accident comprehends a scheme which deserves a generous, bountiful and open-handed construction and consideration by the court. Without giving violence to the language of the statutory provisions and without damaging the well accepted norms of construction articulated in several decisions of this Court as well as of the Supreme Court, a liberal construction of the provisions would' certainly promote the intention of the legislature. In this background, counsel submitted that the provisions contained in S.6 of the Limitation Act can be made applicable to proceedings before the Tribunal for compensation. He also contended that since the applicant is a minor and he has not attained majority when the application was filed, the delay in filing the claim petition deserves to be condoned under the proviso to S.110A(3) of the Act, since if a generous construction of S.110A (3) of the Motor Vehicles Act is taken, the minority of the applicant can be treated as a cause which prevented the applicant from filing the application within the time prescribed under S.110A (3) of the Act.

5. We shall examine the question of applicability of S.6 of the Limitation Act in the light of S.29(2) of the Limitation Act and the statutory provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act. S.29(2) of the Limitation Act reads as follows:

"29(1)

(2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of S.3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of