The main legal point established in the judgment is the distinction between Art.30 and Art.31 of the Limitation Act, highlighting the starting point for limitation and the types of compensation covered under each article.

1. The question in this second appeal is one of limitation -whether Art.30 of the Limitation Act of 1908 applies to the case or whether Art.31 applies. The question of limitation was not considered in full by the trial court, the Munsif just saying that it was not established how the suit was barred. Before the Subordinate Judge three decisions, two of the Travancore-Cochin High Court and one of the Calcutta High Court, were cited. And the Subordinate Judge, following them, has held that there was no limitation.

2. The facts are simple. The appellant, the Southern Railway, short-delivered goods to the respondent, the consignee. The consignment was 22.330 tonnes and the delivery was 21 tonnes with the result that 1330 kilograms were short-delivered. The delivery was on 9th May 1961; and the suit was filed on 23rd July 1962, more than a year after the short-delivery. The Railway Administration claimed that the suit was barred under Art.31, while the respondent claimed that the suit came within Art.30- The second appeal came before a learned judge of this Court; and learned judge placed the case before a Division Bench since, in his opinion, the question involved, viz., whether it was Art.31 that applied or Art.30 that applied to a case of short-delivery, was an important question which required consideration by a Division Bench for an authoritative decision on the question. That is how the case has come before us. Art.30 and 31 read:

3. At the outset we shall dispose of the three decisions referred to by the Subordinate Judge. The two decisions of the Travancore-Cochin High Court are Union of India v. Adam Hajee Peer Mohammed Essack (1956 KLT. 40) and Muhammadi Steamship Co. v. Keserishih Vallabdas (1956 KLT. 706); and the decision of the Calcutta High Court is Jainarain v. The Governor-General of India (AIR. 1951 Cal. 462). These decisions have laid down that, where no time is fixed for delivery of the goods and where correspondence ensues between the consignor (in this case the consignee) and the Railway Administration in the course of which the railway assures or promises enquiries and never denies liability, limitation does not begin until the correspondence ends either fruitlessly or with a final repudiation of liability by the railway. These decisions appear to go against the language of Art.31, the third column of which says "When the goods ought to be delivered". The point of time contemplated by the third column is "when the goods ought to be delivered", i. e., the point of time after a reasonable time for delivery after the goods were entrusted, with the carrier. At any rate, the matter is now put beyond doubt by the decision of the Supreme Court in Boota Mal v. Union of India (AIR. 1952 SC. 1716). Wanchoo J. has stated in this decision that the correspondence between the carrier and the consignee cannot alter the starting point for limitation contained in Art.31. The learned judge has said that the correspondence may be looked into if it has a bearing on the question of reasonable time (unless, of course, the agreement itself is that the goods would be delivered on a particular day, in which case the reasonable time is the time agreed upon). The learned judge has said:

"But the correspondence can only be taken into account to determine what would be the reasonable time and not to show that because of the subsequent conduct of the railway the reasonable time got extended by the time taken by the railway in tracing the goods."

It is thus clear that, after the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court, the three decisions mentioned above and other similar decisions of all the High Courts ceased to be good law.

4. The position is this. If there is a date agreed upon for delivering the goods, that is the starting point for limitation, since that is the time when the goods ought to be delivered. If no such time is fixed the time for delivery is reasonable time depending upon the circumstances in each case, depending up