Kurian Joseph, J.

The validity of recently introduced Rule 35(22) of the Kerala Manufacture and Sale of Stamp Rules, 1960 is under challenge in these cases. The said Rule reads as follows:

"35 (22) In the event of the death of a licensed stamp vendor, the District Treasury Officer shall take immediate steps for filling up the vacancy:

Provided that, if the death occurs before attaining the age of 65 years, a legal heir duly authorized by the other legal heirs, if any, may be appointed as the licensed vendor in the vacancy if he is otherwise qualified to be appointed and makes out an application before the District Treasury Officer within three months from the date of death."

2. Appellant is the writ petitioner. The writ petition was filed mainly with the following prayer:

"Declare that the Sub Rule 22 of Rule 35 of the Kerala Manufacture and Sale of Stamp (Amendment) Rules, 2007 will work out prospectively in so far as it is applicable only to those vendors who will attain 65 years of age after the date of coming into force of the Act."

3. The learned Single Judge declined to grant the relief. It was held that any claim for appointment by a legal heir made subsequent to the introduction of Ext.P1 Rules has to be dealt with in the light of the amended Rules. In that case the original licensee expired on 11.12.2008, after crossing the age of 65 years. Therefore, the application filed by the petitioner in his capacity as legal heir was rejected. It was further held by the learned Single Judge that the sub-rule (22) quoted above has been introduced as a concession extended to the legal heirs of the licensee who had not attained the age of 65 and therefore, it is for the Government to fix such a condition.

4. In W.P.(C) No.33615 of 2007 the licensed stamp vendor died on 3.9.2007 at the age of 87 and, therefore, the application filed by the petitioner as the legal heir was not considered. In the said writ petition also the challenge is to the validity of the Rules on the ground of discrimination on the basis of age.

5. What is the principle or policy that would best serve the object and purpose of the Act is for the Legislature or its delegate to decide. That is a well settled principle. The courts will not be justified in sitting in judgment over the wisdom of the policy maker and striking down a regulation on the only ground that in the view of the court a provision is not reasonable. It is also a well settled position that the unreasonableness that invalidates a subordinate legislation is not the antonym of reasonableness as understood in common parlance. That unreasonableness which invalidates a subordinate legislation is manifest arbitrariness or injustice to the extent of holding inevitably that the Legislature never intended to give authority to the rule maker to make such a Rule. In Mixnam's Properties Ltd. v. Chertsey Urban District Council (1964 (1) Q.B.214 at 237), Lord Diplock has succinctly analyzed the true sense of unreasonableness in legal parlance. The relevant portion of the judgment reads as follows:

"The various special grounds upon which subordinate legislation has sometimes been said to be void - for example, because it is unreasonable; because it is uncertain; because it is repugnant to the general law or to some other statute - can, I think, today be properly regarded as being particular application of the general rule that subordinate legislation, to be valid, must be shown to be within the powers conferred by the statute.

Thus, the kind of unreasonableness which invalidates a by-law is not the antonym of "unreasonableness" in the sense of which that expression is used in the common law, but such manifest arbitrariness, injustice or partiality that a court would say: "Parliament never intended to give authority to make such rules; they are unreasonable and ultra vires."

6. In Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) Private Ltd. and others v. Union of India and others (AIR 1986 SC 515) the Supreme Cour