IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
C.T.RAVIKUMAR, J.
ISSAC K.J – Appellant
Vs.
REGHUNATHAN CHETTIAR AND ORS. – Respondent
Crl.R.P.No.1573 of 2014
Decided On : 06.04.2015
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 - Sections 138 & 142(b) - Limitation Act, 1963 - Sections 12(1) & 12(2) - General Clauses Act, 1897 - Section 9 - Information - Receipt of - Held, Date is to be excluded for the aforesaid purpose and if that is excluded in the light of the decisions in K. Madhu's case Syed Hamid Bafaky's case (1996 Crl. L.J. 1013) it could only be said that the first respondent did make a demand for the amount covered by cheque in writing by giving notice within 30 days as contemplated under proviso (b) to S.138 of N.I. Act.
This revision petition is filed against the conviction concurrently entered against the revision petitioner for the offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (in short `N.I. Act'). The revisionist was the accused in C.C.No.126 of 2009 before the Court of Judicial First Class Magistrate-V, Thiruvananthapuram and the first respondent herein was the complainant therein. The trial court found the revision petitioner guilty and convicted him under Section 138 of the N.I. Act and sentenced him to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of 15 days and to pay a fine of 1,50,000/-. In case of default in payment of fine he was ordered to undergo simple imprisonment for a further period of 15 days. The amount of fine on remittance was directed to be paid to the complainant as compensation under Section 357(1) Cr.P.C. Aggrieved by the same the revision petitioner preferred Crl.A.No.467 of 2012. The appellate court on a careful evaluation of the evidence found the contentions raised by the revision petitioner as meritless and consequently, confirmed the conviction entered against him by the trial court under Section 138 of the N.I. Act. However, the sentence imposed on him therefor, was modified. The substantive sentence imposed by the trial court was modified as sentence to undergo imprisonment till rising of the court. The sentence to pay fine imposed by the trial court was maintained by the appellate court. At the same time, the default sentence was interfered with and in place of the order to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of 15 days the appellate court directed him to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of three months in case of failure to pay the amount of fine. The order to pay the amount of fine, on realisation, as compensation to the complainant was also maintained by the appellate court. This revision petition is filed in the said circumstances.
2. I have heard the learned counsel for the revision petitioner, the learned counsel for the first respondent and also the learned Public Prosecutor.
3. As is obvious from the facts expatiated earlier conviction was concurrently entered against the revision petitioner under Section 138 of the N.I. Act. When that be the position, to make this Court to invoke the revisional jurisdiction the revision petitioner has to make out a case of utter perverse appreciation of evidence by the courts below. It is also permissible to invoke the revisional jurisdiction in case the findings are based on no evidence or suffering from any error of law. The learned counsel appearing for the revision petitioner attempted to canvass the position that the impugned judgment is an outcome of utter, perverse appreciation of evidence. It is contended that the courts below had not considered the question raised by the revision petitioner that the execution of the cheque in question was not proved by the complainant and therefore, the benefit of the presumption under Section 139 was not available to the first respondent/complainant. Yet another contention of the revision petitioner is that the defence evidence was not properly appreciated by the courts below. Above all, it is contended that no proper statutory notice was given in writing by the complainant/first respondent inasmuch as Ext.P3 lawyer notice was issued beyond the statutorily prescribed period. In case of failure to issue the notice within the statutorily prescribed time limit it would strike at the root of the matter and would vitiate the very prosecution itself and hence I think it only appropriate to consider firstly the said contention. For considering the said contention in an appropriate manner a glance at Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, bearing in mind the date of receipt of information from the bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid and the date on which the statutory notice was made in writing, is inevitable. There is no dispute with respect to the date of receipt of informa
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