Ashok Bhushan, J.

A three Judge Bench has made the reference by order dated 16.10.2014 doubting correctness of an earlier Full Bench judgment of this Court reported in Binu Chacko v. R.T.A., Pathanamthitta (2006(2) KLT 172). In the reference order the Full Bench has observed that in Binu Chacko's case (supra), the Full Bench has dilated regarding the scope of the phrase 'person aggrieved'. The matter was placed before the Full Bench by reference order dated 30.3.2011 by a Division Bench. The learned Division Bench, after noticing the ratio of the Full Bench judgment in Binu Chacko's case (supra) and a Division Bench judgment in Girija Devi v. K.T.Mathew (1991(1) KLT 353), which was relied on in Binu Chakco's case (supra), in paragraphs 6 to 10, has opined as follows:

"6. From time to time question arose whether the existing operators have any legal right to raise such objections. The question which actually fell for consideration of the Full Bench in Binu Chacho v. R.T.A., Pathanamthitta [2006(2) KLT 172] was whether an oder granting permit is a revisable order under Section 90 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 at the instance of a business rival, i.e., an existing permit holder. In view of apparently inconsistent views taken by two Division Benches of this Court, the matter came to be referred to Full Bench and by the abovementioned judgment, the Full Bench held at paragraph 28 as follows:

"We are of the view that the existing operator cannot invoke the revisional jurisdiction on the sole ground that the grant of permit to the opposite party prejudicially affects his rights. It is not as though he can impeach each and every order of the RTA or STA alleging illegality or impropriety. He can challenge only those orders against which he can have a legal grievance. He cannot be a person aggrieved in respect of every action or decision of RTA or STA. There are grievances which would give rise to a cause of action exclusively for the passengers only or sometimes to a local authority and the like. If the existing operator is given the right to challenge the very grant of permit or renewal of permit on the ground that he is aggrieved by such grant, it will amount to resurrecting a right which he was entitled to avail only under the old Act. It will be illogical and irrational to interpret the expression "person aggrieved" in Section 90 of the Act in such a manner as to take away the right given to a new entrant at the pre-permit stage to have a permit under the Act without obstruction from those already in the business, the very moment he is granted or issued a permit. Under normal circumstances, grievance of the existing operator shall be confined to disputes relating to settlement of timings and cannot be entertained against the grant of permit or renewal of permit as such."

7. The Full Bench reached on such a conclusion on the basis of an earlier Division Bench judgment reported in Girija Devi v. K.T. Mathew [1991(1) KLT 353]. We may mention here that neither in the Full Bench decision nor in the abovementioned Division Bench decision, there is discussion either on the language of Rule 212 or interpretation of the said rule in the context of the scheme of the new Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. The Full Bench took note of the fact that in view of the decision in Mithilesh Garg v. Union of India [AIR 1992 SCC 443] there is a change of the legislative policy under the 1988 Act compared to its predecessor Act of 1939 and therefore came to the conclusion that the existing operator cannot object to the grant of the permit, but the existing operator can raise objection regarding settlement of timings. With utmost respect to the Full Bench, we are of the opinion that such a conclusion, to our mind, appears to be inconsistent with the other principle laid down by the Full Bench that the existing operator has no right to object to the grant of new permits.

8. The learned counsel for the appellants however, referred to proviso to Rule 212 (3) w