1. Original petitioner herein is the father of the respondents herein, who are minors, represented by the mother. He had married the mother of the minors on 24.06.2001. After the birth of the children, relationship got strained and matrimonial proceedings were initiated. The children, through their mother, moved M.C.No.543 of 2010 before the Family Court, Thrissur, claiming monthly maintenance under section 125 Cr.P.C. Two proceedings were initiated by the mother and an application for Divorce was filed by the father. While the matters were pending, disputes were resolved. An endorsement was made on behalf of the children on the files and maintenance petition was dismissed, by Ext.P3 order. Thereafter, the children, came to know that the father had not withdrawn his application for divorce as agreed and had in fact obtained an exparte decree of divorce. Hence they filed M.P.No.1433 of 2013 to recall Ext.P3 order and to restore M.C.No.543 of 2010 to file. It was accompanied by another application to condone the delay in filing M.P.No.1433 of 2013. Family Court, after hearing both sides allowed the applications overruling the objections filed by the husband. This is assailed in this original petition.

2. The premise on which the above writ petition is laid and the argument was advanced was that the court below, after having dismissed the application, had no power under the Family Courts Act or the Rules framed there under, to restore or recall an order passed by it. It was contended that the statutory provisions did not enable the Family Court, which was essentially exercising the powers under section 125 Cr.P.C. and thereby governed by the provisions of the Cr.P.C, to restore the application which was dismissed. The further contention was that restoration of an application for maintenance under section 125 Cr.P.C was not contemplated under the Statute, either expressly or impliedly, but was in fact, barred under section 362 Cr.P.C. It was contended that the Court had no express, implied or inherent power to restore such an application. Per contra, learned counsel for the petitioner contended that even though no specific provision for restoration or recalling the order was available, to advance the cause of justice and in the interest of equity, the Courts have inherent and implied authority to recall its own order. Various authorities were cited by both sides in support of their contentions.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner relied on the two Full Bench decisions of this Court to contend that Family Court, while exercising the jurisdiction under section 125 Cr.P.C, acts as a criminal court and is governed by the Cr.P.C. In Satyabhama v. Ramachandran ((1997)2 KLT 503), it was held that Family Court act as a criminal court and not as a civil court, while disposing the applications filed under section 125 of the Cr.P.C. It was held that while exercising jurisdiction under Chapter IX Cr.P.C, the Family Courts act as a Criminal Court and not a Civil Court. This was in the light of S.7(2) of the Family Courts Act. This view was reiterated by another Full Bench in Peter v. Sara (2006(4) KLT 219(FB). However, Hon'ble Supreme Court in Nanda Lal Misra v. Kanhaiya Lal Misra (AIR 1960 SC 882) had taken the view that the relief of maintenance granted was essentially of civil nature. However, the Full Bench of this Court followed the Law laid down in S.A.L.Narayan Row and Anr. v. Ishwarlal Bhagwandas and Anr. (AIR 1965 SC 1818). The question that was considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the above decision was whether proceeding taken for recovery of tax was a civil proceeding. In Mst. Jagir Kaur and another v. Jaswant Singh (AIR 1963 SC 1521), the Supreme Court had held that the proceedings for maintenance are in the nature of civil proceedings and the remedy is a summary one. In Savitri v. Govind Singh Rawat (1985(4) SCC 357), Supreme Court held that jurisdiction under Chapter IX of Cr.PC was strictly not criminal jurisdic