K.T.SANKARAN, J.

1. The petitioners are the decree holders in O.S.No.148 of 1979, on the file of the Munsiff's Court, Kottarakkara. The Execution Petition filed by them as E.P.No.91 of 2000 was dismissed on the ground of limitation, which is under challenge in this Revision.

2. The decree was passed on 20.12.1986. The defendants filed appeal. The appeal was dismissed for default on 6.3.1996. The decree holders filed an Execution Petition on 31.3.1999, which was dismissed for default on 26.5.2000. Later, the present Execution Petition, namely, E.P.No.91 of 2000 was filed on 21.8.2000. The Execution Petition was dismissed by the order dated 21.10.2002 on the ground that it is barred by limitation. On 18.11.2002, the decree holders filed a Review Petition as E.A.No.217 of 2002. That Review Petition was dismissed on 4.11.2003. Meanwhile, the order dated 21.10.2002 was challenged in Revision on 30.5.2003.

3. Sri.T.K.Kurikesu, learned counsel appearing for the decree holders submitted that the period of limitation for the Execution Petition is to be computed from 6.3.1996, the date on which the appeal was dismissed for default. He submitted that under Article 136 of the Limitation Act the period begins to run when the decree becomes enforceable. He stated that even if the dismissal of the appeal was for default, it is nevertheless a decision in the appeal and, therefore, time has to be computed from that date. Sri.Kurikesu relied on the decisions in Kamalamma v. Trivandrum Permanent Bank (1986 KLT 1181), Shyam Sundar Sarma v. Pannalal Jaiswal (2005(1) KLT 198(SC)), Meenakshi Amma v. Rama Kurup (1973 KLT 489), Sheodan Singh v. Daryao Kunwar (AIR 1966 SC 1332) and Palichavla Venkataramana Reddy v. Chittamuru Subbarami Reddy and another (1969(1) Andhra Law Times Reports 332).

4. Sri.K.Subhash Chandra Bose, learned counsel appearing for the respondents/judgment debtors, contended that since the appeal was dismissed for default, there could be no merger of the decree in the order dismissing the appeal for default. The order dismissing the appeal for default would not be a decree within the meaning of section 2(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure. If there is no merger, unless the execution of the decree is stayed or otherwise the decree holder is prevented from executing the decree, time will begin to run from the date of the decree. Admittedly, the Execution Petition was filed beyond the period of twelve years from the date of the decree of the trial court. Sri. K.Subhash Chandra Bose relied on the decisions in Ratansingh v. Vijaysingh (2001 (1) KLT 327 (SC) = (2001) 1 SCC 469), Chandi Prasad and others v. Jagdish Prasad and others ((2004) 8 SCC 724) and in Manohar v. Jaipalsing (2008(1) KLT 832 (SC)). The counsel also submitted that even the Execution Petition filed by the decree holders earlier on 31.3.1999 was barred by limitation and that Execution Petition was filed much after the dismissal of the appeal. The learned counsel also pointed out that at the time when the Revision was filed, the order impugned in the Revision was sought to be reviewed on the application of the revision petitioners and that Review Petition was subsequently dismissed on 4.11.2003. It is submitted that the Revision itself is not therefore maintainable.

5. In Ratan singh v. Vijay singh (2001 (1) KLT 327 (SC) = (2001) 1 SCC 469), the trial court passed the decree on 14.12.1970 and the appeal filed by the defendant was dismissed on 1.8.1973. The Execution Petition was filed on 24.3.1988, which was beyond the period of twelve years from the date of the appellate court decree. It was contended that the Second Appeal filed by the defendant was dismissed by the High Court on 31.3.1976 as it was time barred and the period of twelve years had to be computed from that date. Negativing the contention of the decree holder, the Supreme Court held:

"8. When does a decree become enforceable? Normally a decree or order becomes enforceable from its date. But cases are not u