1. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Radhakrishnan, J. -- Question raised in both these appeals has already been answered by a Division Bench of this court in District Executive Officer v. Abel (2006 (2) KLT 758). Bench has taken the view that Government have no power to condone delay in filing an appeal beyond sixty days from the date of receipt of order under S.8(5) of the Motor Transport Workers Welfare Fund Act, 1985. Bench also held that S.5 of the Limitation Act does not apply to proceedings under that Act.

2. Counsel appearing for the appellants, however, has sought for reconsideration of the Bench decision in Abel's case. Counsel submitted that the impact of S.29(2) of the Limitation Act has not been considered by the Bench. Counsel submitted that S.29(2) of the Limitation Act specifically provides that S.4 to 24 of the Limitation Act would squarely apply to Government and also other authorities to condone the delay in filing application. Counsel submitted that the period of limitation is prescribed in the Kerala Motor Transport Workers Welfare Fund Act which is a special law. The period of limitation for filing appeal is fixed as sixty days from the date of receipt of a copy of the order of the original authority and the Limitation Act does not prescribe any period of limitation for filing appeal under the provisions of the Motor Transport Workers Welfare Fund Act. Under such circumstance S.29(2) would squarely apply and hence S.5 of the Limitation Act as well. Counsel also submitted that the Kerala Motor Workers Welfare Fund Act does not exclude expressly any of the provisions of the Limitation Act and hence S.5 is applicable by virtue of S.29(2) of the Limitation Act. In support of the contention counsel placed reliance on the decision of the apex court in Gopalan v. Aboobacker (1995 (2) KLT 205 (SC)).

3. Counsel appearing for the Welfare Fund Board submitted that there is no necessity for reconsidering Abel's case and submitted that the Government acting under the Motor Transport Workers Welfare Fund Act is not acting as a court and hence the provisions of the Limitation Act would not apply. In support of that contention counsel also placed reliance on the decisions of the apex court in Nityanand v. L.I.C. of India (AIR 1970 SC 209) and Officer on Special Duty (Land Acquisition) v. Shah Manilal Chandulal (1996 AIR SCW 941).

4. We may point out that this issue came up for consideration before this court for the first time in Kerala Motor Transport Workers Welfare Fund Board v. Government of Kerala (2001 (1) KLT 608). The Bench while interpreting S.8(5) of the Motor Transport Workers Welfare Fund Act, 1985 held that the Government is not entitled to entertain any appeal filed under S.8 (5) of the Act beyond the prescribed period of sixty days. The court took the view, in the absence of any provision expressly conferring power on the appellate authority to entertain an appeal on any count after the period of limitation prescribed under the statute, the appellate authority is not competent to entertain a time barred appeal and there is no implied power conferred on the appellate authority to condone the delay and entertain the appeal. This view was endorsed by another Division Bench consisting of one of us, K. S. Radhakrishnan, J, in Abel's case (supra).

5. The decision in Abel's case was followed in Khalid v. State of Kerala (2006 (3) KLT 226). Abel's case was decided placing reliance on the decision of the apex court in Salami v. Tanaji (1985 (3) SCC 5906), where the apex court was dealing with the powers of the District Collector functioning under the Andhra Pradesh (Telengana Area) Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950. Delay in filing the appeal before the Collector under S.90 beyond the period prescribed under S.93 was sought to be condoned. Claim was considered by the District Collector and refused. Rejecting the contention the apex court held that the Collector before whom the appeal was preferred by th

Click Here to Read the rest of this document