Devan Ramachandran, J.

The manner, modus and approach to the appointment to the posts of Special Public Prosecutors (SPP) under the Protection of Children From Sexual Offences Act, 2012 ('the POCSO' Act) has been called into focus by the appellants and the petitioners in the above two appeals and writ petitions.

2. The proximal and immediate cause for the appellants/petitioners to approach this Court appears to be the issuance of an order bearing No.G.O.(Rt) No.2117/2017/Home dated 24.06.2017 by the Government of Kerala relating to the appointment of SPPs in the thirteen Special Courts constituted for each district in Kerala, except Ernakulam under the POCSO Act. This order is available on record as Exhibit P7 in the above writ petitions and as Exhibit R1(c) in W.A.No.2385/2018.

3. Through this order, the Government took a decision to make appointment to the posts of SPPs adopting the procedure under Section 24(4)of the Code of Criminal Procedure as also the Kerala Government Law Officers (Appointment and Conditions of Service) and conduct of Cases Rules ('the KGLO Rules' for brevity). On a reading of this order, it becomes discernible that the Government is under the impression that since no Rules for the appointment of SPPs in the Special Courts under the POCSO Act have yet been framed, such appointments will be better done as per Section 24(4)of the Cr.P.C.

4. The primary challenge by the appellants/petitioners, who are all aspirants to the posts of SPPs in the various Special Courts, is that the said appointment ought to be done exclusively under the procedural provisions of Section 32 of the POCSO Act and that for such reason, Section 24(4)of the Cr.P.C. cannot be attracted or adopted.

5. In effect, the appellants/petitioners singularly contend that the prescription under Section 32 of the POCSO Act is independent of Section 24(4) of the Cr.P.C. and that the procedure for appointment as SPPs can be done only as per the mandate of the POCSO Act independent of the provisions under the Cr.P.C.

6. The point for decision is certainly short but its legal import is deep, thus meriting incisive examination.

7. In formal terms, the primary question is whether the SPPs under the POCSO Act are to be appointed as per a self-contained procedure available under that Act, if any, divorced from the mandate of Section 24(4) of Cr.P.C. All other contentions in these cases are corollary to this and they would, therefore, obtain answers being modulated by our view on this one issue.

8. We have heard Sri.S.Sreekumar, Sri.Bechu Kurian Thomas and Sri.Ramesh Chander, learned Senior Counsel, assisted by Sri.P.Martin Jose, Sri.Paul Jacob, Smt.K.A.Sanjeetha, appearing for the appellants/petitioners, the learned Advocate General appearing for the official respondents, Sri.Grashious Kuriakose, the learned Senior Counsel, Sri.Rakesh Roshan, Sri.Siju Kamalasanan, Sri.T.K.Biju and Sri.M.Gopikrishnan Nambiar, learned counsel appearing for the party respondents.

9. The hypostasis of the assertions-in-law of the appellants/petitioners being built on Section 32 of the POCSO Act and since the provisions of that Section becomes fundamental for our evaluation, we quote it as under:

“32. Special Public Prosecutors.-(1) The State Government shall, by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint a Special Public Prosecutor for every Special Court for conducting cases only under the provisions of this Act.

(2) A person shall be eligible to be appointed as a Special Public Prosecutor under sub-section (1) only if he had been in practice for not less than seven years as an advocate.

(3) Every person appointed as a Special Public Prosecutor under this section shall be deemed to be a Public Prosecutor within the meaning of clause(u)of section 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) and provision of that Code shall have effect accordingly.”

10. As seen above, the appellants/petitioners contend that the appointment of SPPs under the POCSO Act will have to be