Important Points:
There is no warrant for such a narrow and restrictive view of the powers of the Magistrate, particularly when such powers are traceable to Section 156(3) read with Section 156(1), Section 2(h), and Section 173(8) of the CrPC, as has been noticed hereinabove, and would be available at all stages of the progress of a criminal case before the trial actually commences. It would also be in the interest of justice that this power be exercised suo motu by the Magistrate himself, depending on the facts of each case. Whether further investigation should or should not be ordered is within the discretion of the learned Magistrate who will exercise such discretion on the facts of each case and in accordance with law. If, for example, fresh facts come to light which would lead to inculpating or exculpating certain persons, arriving at the truth and doing substantial justice in a criminal case are more important than avoiding further delay being caused in concluding the criminal proceeding.

JUDGMENT :

A. HARIPRASAD, J.

Introduction

1. It is often said: “A Judge does not preside over a criminal trial merely to see that no innocent man is punished, he also presides to see that a guilty man does not escape and one is as important as the other”. We are called upon to apply this proposition to the facts in this case.

2. In this appeal by the State against acquittal of the accused/respondent, various factual and legal questions are raised to dislodge the trial court's findings. Allegations against the accused/respondent, in nut shell, are that the accused trespassed into a house, where an old lady was staying alone, in order to commit an offence of robbery with an attempt to cause her death. Thereafter he cold-bloodedly hacked the hapless old lady with a sharp weapon to death. After committing the crime, he caused the disappearance of evidence relating to the crime.

3. Court below on an appreciation of evidence found that the investigation conducted was totally unfair to the accused and the investigating officers cooked up false evidence to procure his conviction. Trial court also found that the prosecution witnesses are untrustworthy. On the above reasonings, the court below not only acquitted the accused, but initiated legal action against the two investigating officers. Penalty was imposed on them for the perceived improper investigation.

4. We may refer to Stirland v. Director of Public Prosecutions (1944 AC (PC) 315) to appreciate the legal questions arising in this case. It was a case where the appellant was on a trial for forgery. He put his character in issue and asserted in examination in chief that he had never been “charged” with any offence. In cross examination, questions were asked suggesting that on a previous occasion he had been questioned about a suggested forgery by his former employer. He was convicted in the trial and he appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeal against the conviction and sentence. When the appeal was dismissed, he approached the Privy Council. In that matter, we find the famous quotation by Viscount Simon L.C., thus:

“A question whether the accused, who has put his character in issue, was not suspected of a previous crime of which he was never charged in court, or, if charged, was acquitted, is an example of a case where the judge should intervene. It is true that a miscarriage of justice may arise from the acquittal of the guilty no less than from the conviction of the innocent, but when Maxwell's case (1935) A.C.309) decided that where the prosecution had enough evidence to indict a man for a crime, but not enough to convict, no questions can be asked about that incident in a later trial at which he puts his character in issue, how can mere suspicion alleged to have been entertained by his previous employer on an earlier occasion be a legitimate topic for cross-examination to credit?”

Finally, the Privy Council found that improper questions were attempted at the time of trial because of failure of the counsel to object such questions which led to the conviction of the appellant. Therefore, the Privy Council, observing that there was substantial miscarriage of justice, allowed the appeal. Based on the observations therein, a line of thinking developed that a wrong acquittal of an accused is as bad as a wrong conviction. The principle has been restated by courts in different language in very many cases. We are called upon to pronounce not only on the correctness of acquittal, but also on the power of the trial court to pass strictures against the police officers, who investigated the crime, without affording them an opportunity to explain and also the court's authority to impose exemplary penalty on them.

Facts:

5. Sundari Amma, the murderee, was residing in an old tiled building having four residential units, sharing common walls and a roof. She earned her livelihood by making and selling idlies (rice cakes) to the nearby hotels. She was about 67 years at the time of her murderous death. P