IMPORTANT POINTS
The decision of DLAC is without any power. It is made clear that this Court is not interfering with the decision of DLAC for the simple reason that the building has been allowed to come up. There is no challenge to the decision of DLAC-Without unsettling the decision, the remaining question has to be answered.

JUDGMENT :

A. MUHAMED MUSTAQUE, J.

1. Relief, as sought for by the petitioner, is against the objections raised by the Town Planner, Palakkad, in a matter related to the construction in paddy land. This construction was undertaken based on the order of permission granted by the District Level Authorised Committee (DLAC) constituted under Section 9 of the Kerala Conservation of Paddy Land and Wet Land Act, 2008 [Act 28 of 2008]. The objection pointed out by the Town Planner, essentially, is referring to noncompliance of coverage under the Kerala Municipality Building Rules, 1999 for constructing the residential house in a land of 5 cents based on permission granted by DLAC.

2. During the course of hearing this Court entertained doubt in regard to the legality of the order passed by DLAC by granting permission to a landowner who consciously purchased a land being a paddy land in the year 2015. Taking note of nature of order and its impact, if such order is allowed to muster the backing of the law, this Court sought views of the Government. Accordingly, the learned Additional Advocate General, Shri Renjith Thampan addressed this Court.

3. The learned Additional Advocate General after referring to the very statement of objects and reasons of Act 28 of 2008 submitted the Act itself was brought in to preserve and conserve the paddy land. However, the Legislature taking note of the rigour of the statutory provision which would prevent the owner from converting or reclaiming the land, allowed the owner of such paddy land to reclaim paddy land for construction of a residential building. According to the learned Additional Advocate General, ‘owner’ referred to under the statutory provision in Section 9 of Act 28 of 2008 is the owner who would be affected at the time of introduction of Act 28 of 2008 as on 12.8.2008. Therefore, the learned Additional Advocate General argued that the title ‘owner’ who becomes successor by virtue of alienation or transfer could not claim the benefit of reclamation as provided under Section 9 of Act 28 of 2008.

4. The learned Additional Advocate General referred to the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court in Thankachan K.S. vs. District Collector, Alappuzha and Others, 2017 (3) KHC 402. This Court in the above judgment accepted the argument that the ‘owner’ referred to under Section 9 is the owner as on the date of enactment. The learned Additional Advocate General also placed reliance on another judgment of this Court in Yousuf Chalil vs. State of Kerala and Others, 2019 KHC 699, wherein the learned Single Judge declined to issue a writ of mandamus to the Local Level Monitoring Committee to consider an application for reclamation of paddy land for construction of a residential building. In Yousuf Chalil’s case, the applicant purchased the property only in the year 2019. Therefore, the learned Single Judge was of the view that no direction can be issued contrary to law, nor can the Court direct an authority to act in contravention of the statutory provisions. This judgment was set aside by the Division Bench reported in Yousuf Chalil vs. State of Kerala and Others, 2019 KHC 5618. The Division Bench did not answer the question related to reclamation by an owner of a paddy land who became the owner by subsequent purchase after the enactment came into force. The Division Bench set aside the judgment solely for the reason that the learned Single Judge could not have refused a writ of mandamus as it is for the statutory authority to consider whether the application is maintainable or not. It is in that background this Court has to examine the scope of power exercised by DLAC to grant permission to reclaim a paddy land purchased after the Act 28 of 2008 came into force on 12.8.2008.

5. As already observed, the issue as above is not directly involved in this case. Nevertheless, this Court cannot remain oblivious to such a blatant violation of the statutory provisions by DLAC while granting permission. If t