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2021 Supreme(Ker) 1028
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
S.V. BHATTI, A. BADHARUDEEN, JJ.
Kozhikara Veettil Seyd Alavi (Died) – Petitioner
Versus
P.B. Abdul Hameed S/o Bava – Respondent
O.P. (Wakf) No. 3446 of 2013
Decided On : 10-12-2021
Advocate Appeared:
For the Petitioner: Sri. T.M. Abdul Latheef.
For the Respondents: Sri. T.K. Hassan, Sri. Jamsheed Hafiz, Sri. P.K. Mohammed Puzhakkara.
Point of Law : When “sufficient cause” is shown, the court is bound to exercise its discretion to render justice by condoning the delay.
Headnote:
Limitation Act - Section 5 – To call for the records – Transfer of case - condone delay of 15 days in filing petition for re-admission - element of 'sufficient cause' - whether 'sufficient cause' for excusing the delay is shown to exercise the discretion vested with the court in favour of the part.
Finding of the Court:
When “sufficient cause” is shown, the court is bound to exercise its discretion to render justice by condoning the delay- At the same time, the court should take into account the culpable negligence on the party and in such cases the discretion to be exercised in the negative - law is settled that there should not be a pedantic approach while construing the term “sufficient cause” but the principle that is to be borne in mind is that the matter has to be dealt with in a rational, commonsense and pragmatic manner to render substantive justice and to avoid denial of justice.
Result: Original Petition stands allowed
JUDGMENT :
A. BADHARUDEEN, J.
1. This Original petition has been filed by the petitioners, who are aggrieved by Ext.P3 order dated 3.4.2013 passed by the Wakf Tribunal, Ernakulam. The following reliefs sought for in this Original Petition:
“(i) To call for the records relating to Exts.P-1 to P-4 and to issue any order or direction, directing setting aside Ext.P-3 order.
(ii) To issue any order or direction, directing transfer of W.O.A. No. 5 of 2012 and its restoration application pending before the Wakf Tribunal, Ernakulam, to any other Court or Tribunal as this Honourable Court deem fit.
(iii) Any other appropriate, writ, order or direction also may be granted to meet out justice under the circumstances of the above case.”
2. Heard both sides in detail.
3. Perused the order impugned. Precisely the allegation is that W.O.A. No. 5/2012, which was dismissed for default, was sought to be re-admitted for deciding the same on merits by the petitioners. Initially, I.A. No. 243/2012 was filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act to condone delay of 15 days in filing petition for re-admission. Thereafter, I.A. No. 214/2013 also was filed to correct the number of delay as 22 days, instead of 15 days.
4. After hearing both sides, the Wakf Tribunal dismissed the application.
5. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the original petitioners that the Tribunal dismissed the applications on flimsy grounds.
6. On perusal of Ext.P3, technicalities were discussed in detail with a view to non-suit the petitioners though no detailed discussion with regard to the element of “sufficient cause.”
7. Coming to the core issue, Section 5 of the Limitation Act provides extension of prescribed period in certain cases. For clarity, Section 5 of the Limitation Act is extracted hereunder:
“5. Extension of prescribed period in certain cases:
Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), may be admitted after the prescribed period, if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period.
Explanation: The fact that the appellant or the applicant was misled by any order, practice or judgment of the High Court in ascertaining or computing the prescribed period may be sufficient cause within the meaning of this section.”
8. In construing Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the predominant point to be considered is whether “sufficient cause” for excusing the delay is shown to exercise the discretion vested with the court in favour of the party. There are catena of decisions on this point.
9. In Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and Another vs. Mst. Katiji and Others, 1987 (2) SCC 107 a two-Judge Bench of the Apex Court observed that the legislature has conferred power to condone delay by enacting S.5 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on merits. The expression “sufficient cause” employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which sub-serves the ends of justice, for that is the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of courts.
10. In G. Ramegowda, Major and Others vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore, 1988 (2) SCC 142, Venkatachaliah, J. (as his Lordship then was), speaking for the Court, has opined thus:
“The contours of the area of discretion of the courts in the matter of condonation of delays in filing appeals are set out in a number of pronouncements of this Court. Ramlal, Motilal and Chhotelal vs. Rewa Coalfield Ltd. AIR 1962 SC 361, Shakuntala Devi Jain vs. Kuntal Kumari, 1969 (1) SCR 1006, Concord of India Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Nirmala Devi, 1979 (4) SCC 365, Lala Mata Din vs. A. Narayanan, AIR 1969 SC 575 and Collector, Land Acquisition vs. Katiji, 1987 (2) SCC 107 etc. There is, it is tru
