Point of law: Section 8(c) provides that the accused was having personal knowledge of the victim or his family, the court shall presume that the accused was aware of the caste or tribal identity of the victim, unless the contrary is proved.

JUDGMENT :

A. BADHARUDEEN, J.

This appeal is directed against order in Crl.M.P.No.863/2022 dated 02.09.2022 on the file of the Special Court for Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 [hereinafter referred to as `the SC/ST Act' for convenience], Mannarkkad in Crime No.180/2022 of Agali Police Station, Palakkad District. Accused No.1 is the appellant. Respondents are State of Kerala as well as the defacto complainant.

2. The vital questions pose for consideration in this appeal are as under:

i) Whether grant of anticipatory bail is specifically barred in cases involving commission of offences under the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989?

ii) Is relaxation to Section 18 and 18-A of the SC/ST Act is permissible? If so, to what extent?

iii) How the word `knowing' in Section 3(2)(va) of the SC/ST Act to be understood?

3. Heard the learned counsel for the appellant Advocate Balamurali, Advocate P.V.Jeevesh appearing for the defacto complainant and the learned Public Prosecutor, in detail.

4. The prosecution allegation is that the accused Nos.1 and 2 in this crime, who are not members of Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe community, criminally trespassed upon the house of the defacto complainant, who belonged to Scheduled Tribe community, at 11 a.m on 08.07.2022 and threatened her with dire consequences, if she would not be abstaining from proceeding with the Sessions trial pertaining to the death of her son Madhu, going on before the Special Court, Mannarkkad. The specific allegation is that accused Nos.1 and 2, after sharing common intention threatened to murder the defacto complainant, so as to attain ulterior motive in the matter of disturbing trial arising out of the murder of Madhu, who is the son of the defacto complainant. On the above facts, the prosecution alleges commission of offences under Sections 452, 506(ii) and 195A of I.P.C as well as under Section 3(2)(va) of the SC/ST Act.

5. Apprehending arrest in the above case, the appellant/1st accused filed bail application seeking pre-arrest bail before the Special Court and the Special Court apprised the contentions, after hearing the learned counsel for the appellant, the defacto complainant and the learned Public Prosecutor. The Special Court referred Section 18 and 18-A of the SC/ST Act while dismissing the anticipatory bail plea at the instance of the appellant.

6. The learned counsel for the appellant argued that the entire allegations are false and the case is manipulated without any basis. It is submitted by the learned counsel further that the accused is liable to be released on anticipatory bail since no prima facie case made out.

7. It is pointed out by the learned counsel for the defacto complainant as well as the learned Public Prosecutor that grant of anticipatory bail is specifically barred under Section 18 of the SC/ST Act and therefore the court below rightly dismissed the application.

8. Section 18 of the SC/ST Act provides that nothing in Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure shall apply in relation to any case involving the arrest of any person or accusation of an offence committed under this Act.

9. In the decision reported in [(2012) 8 SCC 795 : MANU/SC/0732/2012], Vilas Pandurang Pawar & anr. v. State of Maharashtra & Ors. the Apex Court held as under:

The scope of Section 18 of the SC/ST Act read with Section 438 of the Code is such that it creates a specific bar in the grant of anticipatory bail. When an offence is registered against a person under the provisions of the SC/ST Act, no court shall entertain an application for anticipatory bail, unless it prima facie finds that such an offence is not made out. Moreover, while considering the application for bail, scope for appreciation of evidence and other material on record is limited. The court is not expected to indulge in critical analysis of the evidence on record. When a provision has been enacted in the Special Act to protect the persons who