Point of Law : Section 88 of RERA prescribes that provisions of RERA shall be in addition to and not in derogation of provisions of any other law for time being in force.

JUDGMENT :

[Shoba Annamma Eapen, J.]

1. The short question that arises for consideration in this appeal is as to whether the jurisdiction of the Permanent Lok Adalat constituted under the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 is ousted by the advent of the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 (in short, “RERA”) in dealing with matters relating to housing and real estate services.

2. The impugned judgment dated 08.07.2020 rendered by the learned Single Judge in WP(C) No.14425/2019 is the subject matter of challenge in this intra court appeal filed under Section 5(i) of the Kerala High Court Act, 1958. The appellant is the writ petitioner and the respondents are the respondents in the writ petition.

3. The appellant/petitioner has filed the writ petition with the following prayers;

“i) Issue a writ of certiorari or any other appropriate writ, order or direction, quashing Exhibit P3 Order of the 1st respondent dismissing Exhibit P1 complaint.

ii) Issue a writ of mandamus, directing the 1st respondent to proceed with Exhibit P1 complaint and to pass an award on merits after hearing the parties, within a time frame to be fixed by this Hon'ble Court.”

4. The facts of the case are as follows;

The appellant/petitioner, who is an allottee of a real estate project launched by respondents 2 and 3, entered into an agreement dated 05.02.2015 with respondents 2 and 3 for purchase of 1/5th undivided right in the land measuring 2.48 ares comprised in Mattancherry Village for constructing a flat in the proposed apartment complex, having six flats. The total cost for the undivided share of the land and for construction of the flat agreed was Rs.35,50,000/-, out of which, the appellant/ petitioner paid an amount of Rs.14,00,000/- on the date of booking itself. As per the agreement, rest of the amount was agreed to be paid on receipt of a communication expressing readiness to hand over the apartment to the appellant/petitioner. Since respondents 2 and 3 have failed to construct the apartment in terms of the agreement, the appellant/petitioner forced to withdraw from the agreement and a request was made to refund the amount with interest. As there was no response, the appellant/petitioner preferred Ext.P1 complaint as OP No.32/2018 before the first respondent – the Permanent Lok Adalat – under the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987, (for short, “the Act”) since the disputes relating to “housing and real estate service” come within the purview of “public utility service” under Section 22A of the Act. After hearing the appellant/petitioner, the first respondent passed Ext.P3 order, holding that the first respondent has no jurisdiction to entertain Ext.P1 complaint since RERA came into effect. Aggrieved by Ext.P3 order, the appellant/writ petitioner has approached this Court with the writ petition. The learned Single Judge, after adverting to the facts of the case and hearing the parties, dismissed the writ petition, holding that there is no glaring error of law or fact apparent on the face of record, which justifies an interference with Ext.P3. However, the legal question of concurrent jurisdiction of the Permanent Lok Adalat was left open. Challenging the said judgment of the learned Single Judge, the appellant/petitioner has approached this Court in appeal.

5. Heard Sri.G.Krishnakumar, the learned counsel for the appellant, and Sri.R.Venugopal, the learned counsel for respondents 2 & 3.

6. The learned counsel for the appellant submits that the original dispute relating to “housing and real estate service” was not included under Section 22A of the Act to cloth with the jurisdiction to the first respondent. It is pointed out that as per notification, SO 495(E) published in the gazette dated 16.02.2016, “housing and real estate service” is included within the purview of “public utility service” under Section 22A of the Act. Section 25 of the Act prescribes that the Act is having overriding effect. Hence, the learned counsel for the appellant