The imperative requirement of maintaining anonymity of victims of sexual offences and the plenary protection granted to judges under the Judges (Protection) Act, 1985.

JUDGMENT :

DEVAN RAMACHANDRAN, J.

1. Exordially, this Court is fully conscious of the agony and apprehension of the petitioner and travels with her to the fullest extent, without any reservation.

2. The petitioner is the hapless victim of a sexual offence allegedly committed on her by a Police Officer. It transpires that the said accused obtained bail from this Court and, on the allegation that, in spite of the conditions imposed, he had committed further offences, the prosecution and the petitioner moved independent applications before the learned Magistrate for cancellation of his bail. Pertinently, both these applications were dismissed by the learned Magistrate; but, while delivering judgment, due to an obvious omission, in the order relating to the application of the petitioner, her name and identity were not anonymised.

3. There can be little doubt that the publication of the name and identity of the petitioner must have caused her great agony; and as I have said in the opening paragraph of this judgment, there can be no justification for this, in any manner whatsoever.

4. However, the petitioner, apart from seeking that the official records be anonymised - as far as her name and identity are concerned, also seeks that necessary action be taken against the learned Magistrate who passed the order revealing her identity, under the provisions of Section 228 A of the Indian Penal Code (IPC).

5. As regards the first limb of the request of the petitioner - as impelled by her learned counsel-Sri. V. Sethunath, Sri. B.G. Harindranath - learned Standing Counsel for the High Court of Kerala, admitted unequivocally that the order in question requires to be anonymised immediately, for which, this Court can issue appropriate orders to the learned Magistrate.

6. However, quad hoc the second prayer of the petitioner that the learned Magistrate be proceeded against under Section 228 A of the IPC-Sri. B.G. Harindranath raised serious objections, particularly that this goes contrary to the well enshrined protection to a Judicial Officer under the Judges (Protection) Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for short). He also relied upon the judgment of this Court in Suresh and Another vs. State of Kerala Represented by the Chief Secretary and Others, (2019) 3 KLJ 639 in substantiation.

7. Sri. B.G. Harindranath, thereafter, argued that, though it is without doubt that the order in question ought not to have been issued by the learned Magistrate without anonymising the name and address of the petitioner under Section 228 A of the IPC, no offence can be made out against the said officer, going by its employed phraseology. He impressed upon me that, while the imperative requirement of keeping the identity of a victim of sexual offence secret, is inviolable from the declarations of the Honourable Supreme Court in State of Punjab vs. Ramdev Singh, AIR 2004 SC 219, the inadvertent omission committed by the learned Magistrate will still not expose him/her to any action under Section 228 A of the IPC, particularly when the explanation to sub-clause (3) thereof renders it perspicuous that it is only the printing and publication of a judgment, except that of the High Court or Supreme Court, will amount to an offence under it. He explained that this indubitably means that even when the printing and publication of a judgment of any other Court may perhaps fall within its ambit, it will still not render the learned Magistrate susceptible to any action, for having issued it in exercise of judicial function because that is the specific tenor of the language used, while defining the provision. He thus prayed that this Writ Petition, to the extent to which the petitioner seeks action against the learned Magistrate who issued Ext.P1 order, be dismissed.

8. In reply, Sri. V. Sethunath - learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that his client does not harbour any grudge against the Magistrate, but that she is voicing her cri de coeur through this Writ P