IMPORTANT POINT
The main legal point established in the judgment is the need to balance the academic interest of the child and their right to recreational activities, considering the parens patriae jurisdiction of the State and the right of the child to rest and leisure.

These matters are placed before us based on a reference order of the learned Single Judge. The matter is related to conducting vacation classes during summer vacation of the schools in the State. The learned Single Judge in the reference order doubted the law propounded in I.S.S (English Medium) Senior Secondary School, Perinthalmanna v. State of Kerala [

2018 (2) KHC 849

]. wherein the learned Single Judge of this Court opined that if there is no objection from the parents, teachers and students, the special classes can be conducted during the summer vacation on a condition that the school authorities will provide basic facilities. In the reference order, the learned Single Judge disagreed with the views in the judgment in I.S.S. (English Medium) (supra) as the children require time for leisure and recreation during summer holidays.

2. Heard the learned Senior Counsel Dr. K.P. Satheesan, Senior Counsel Smt. Dhanya P. Ashokan and Shri Isaac Kuruvilla Illikal for the petitioners, learned Standing Counsel Shri S. Nirmal and learned Special Government Pleader Shri T.B. Hood.

3. There are two sets of cases before us - one, the schools which are having affiliation with Boards other than State Board such as affiliation with CBSE, ICSE Boards and the other is schools having recognition under the Kerala Education Rules (KER).

4. Apparently, the question in this context arises as the State attempted to justify their action with reference to Rule 1 of Chapter VII of KER. Rule 1 Chapter VII states that all schools shall be closed for the summer vacation every year on the last working day of March and reopen on the first working day of June unless otherwise notified by the Director. We are of the view that as far as the schools are not the schools recognised under KER, they are not bound by the calendar provided under KER. The calendar of the schools under KER would be applicable only to schools that have obtained recognition from the Government under the KER. See the definition of ‘recognised schools’ under Section 2(8) of the Kerala Education Act vis-a-vis “a private school recognised by the Government under this Act”. In respect of the schools not covered under the Kerala Education Rules or Act, cannot be dealt under the same. It is up to the affiliated body to decide on the calendars, school working time etc. Therefore, the school calendar prescribed under KER cannot be extended to CBSE, ICSE schools, etc. Merely for the reason that for the purpose of affiliation, CBSE insisted recognition or NOC from the State Government, that alone will not bring such schools as a recognised school under KER. Such schools will not be considered recognized under the KER unless established or recognized in accordance with the Kerala Education Act or Rules. Therefore, they are not obliged to follow the calendar framed under KER.

5. However, we find that the Government has executive power to protect the best interest of children. The parens patriae is the jurisdiction of the State cannot be overlooked here. The Apex Court in Charan Lal Sahu v. Union of India, [(1990) 1 SCC 613]; para.35 therein reads as follows :

35. There is the concept known both in this country and abroad, called parens patriae. Dr B.K. Mukherjea in his “Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trust”, Tagore Law Lectures, Fifth Edition, at page 404, referring to the concept of parens patriae, has noted that in English law, the Crown as parens patriae is the constitutional protector of all property subject to charitable trusts, such trusts being essentially matters of public concern. Thus the position is that according to Indian concept parens patriae doctrine recognized King as the protector of all citizens and as parent. In Budhkaran Chaukhani v. Thakur Prosad Shah [AIR 1942 Cal 331 : 46 CWN 425] the position was explained by the Calcutta High Court at page 318 of the report. The same position was reiterated by the said High Court in Banku Behary Mondal v. Banku Behary Hazra [AIR 1943 Cal 2