IMPORTANT POINT
The judgment clarified the right of the judgment debtor to appropriate the amount deposited, even when there is a shortfall at a particular stage, and specified that the appropriation will be subject to the decision in the appeal.

The common question which surfaces for consideration in these Revision Petitions is as follows:

Whether the appellant in a Land Acquisition Appeal -carried from a reference answered in terms of Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 -is entitled to specify the manner of appropriation in respect of a payment made pursuant to an interim order passed in the Land Acquisition Appeal for staying the Award passed by the reference court?

2. In the orders impugned in these Revision Petitions, the learned Additional Sub Judge found that the petitioner herein (second respondent before the Sub Court) has no right to claim appropriation.

3. It requires to be mentioned at the outset that the Land Acquisition Appeals were ultimately dismissed. There is no quarrel before this Court amongst the parties that, if the appropriation as indicated by the judgment debtor in the statement of accounts dated 11.03.2015 is permissible in law, the entire Award amount stands wiped of; whereas, if such appropriation is impermissible, the decree holders are entitled to get the E.P reopened, so as to claim the balance amount due.

4. Heard Sri.P.B.Krishnan, learned counsel for the petitioners, Sri.Vinod Bhat, learned counsel for the first respondent and the learned Government Pleader on behalf of the other respondents.

5. Learned counsel for the petitioners would essentially submit that a Constitution Bench judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Gurpreet Singh v. Union of India [2006(8) SCC 457] was not correctly followed by the learned Sub Judge. In elaboration, learned counsel would point out that the contents of paragraph no.52 of the said judgment was read in isolation, divorced from the entire gamut of the dictum laid down by the Constitution Bench, which perpetrated the error, resulting in dismissal of the petitioners' claim for appropriation. Learned counsel would point out that the judgment debtor's right of specifying the appropriation when a deposit is made to the court as against the sum awarded in the decree/Award is upheld in paragraph no. 51 of the judgment of the Constitution Bench. Once the decree holder receives the payment of the amount so deposited, he would necessarily be accepting the appropriation made by the judgment debtor. This dictum of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. [1996(2)SCC 71] was upheld by the Constitution Bench. In paragraph no.53 of the judgment, the Constitution Bench re-iterated such right of the judgment debtor to appropriate the amount deposited, even when there is a short fall at a particular stage. The ratio laid down in Prem Nath Kapur(supra) on the aspect of appropriation was specifically approved by the Constitution Bench, as is decipherable from paragraph 53 of the judgment. In such circumstances, reading and relying upon the contents in paragraph no.52, divorced from the essential dictum laid down by the Constitution Bench, as contained in paragraph nos.51 and 53, is grossly illegal, is the submission made. Learned counsel would hasten to add that the payment made pursuant to an interim order would still retain the character of a part-payment made to the amount covered by the Award/decree, wherefore, the right of the judgment debtor to specify the appropriation of the amount cannot be obliterated, more so when such right is reinforced and reiterated by the Constitution Bench. According to the learned counsel, the impugned order cannot be sustained which negates such right of the judgment debtor, especially when there is no quarrel on facts that the statement of accounts dated 11.03.2015 made by the judgment debtor specifically indicates the appropriation to be made in respect of the payment made pursuant to the interim order of the High Court.

6. Per contra, learned counsel for the first respondent would submit that in the absence of an enabling direction in the interim order, the judgment debtor is not at liberty in law to suggest/indicate any app