The court emphasized that the determination of whether a stone is a dangerous weapon depends on the specific facts of the case and requires evidence.

ORDER :

1. This Criminal Miscellaneous Case has been filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, to quash Annexure.A1 FIR and Annexure.A2 Final Report in Crime No. 373/2016 of Kodakara Police Station, Thrissur, now pending as C.C. No. 1244/2016 on the files of the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court, Irinjalakkuda. The petitioner herein is the sole accused in the above case.

2. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner, the learned Public Prosecutor and the learned counsel appearing for the defacto complainant, in detail. Perused the relevant materials available.

3. In this matter, the allegation of the prosecution is that, at 10.00 am on 17.03.2016, the accused pursuant to his animosity towards the defacto complainant for questioning cleaning of the boundary of the property, which is under dispute, used obscene words against the defacto complainant and threw a stone to her and thereby caused abrasion on her hand and also threatened to kill her. It is on this premise, the prosecution alleges commission of offences punishable under Sections 324, 294(b) and 506(i) of Indian Penal Code [hereinafter referred as ‘IPC’ for short].

4. While canvasing quashment of the case alleging commission of offences punishable under Sections 324, 294(b) and 506(i) of IPC, it is submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that, a rift in between the neighbors led to registration of this case as well as the counter case, which has been pending as C.C. No. 2879/2016 on the files of the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court, Irinjalakuda. It is argued further that, when the 2nd respondent herein, who is the accused in C.C. No. 2879/2016 approached this Court, with prayer to quash the said proceedings, this Court as per Annexure.A4 order dated 02.06.2020 in Crl. M.C. No. 6168/2017, quashed the Final Report to the extent the same alleged commission of offences punishable under Sections 324, 294(b) and 506(i) of IPC against the 2nd respondent herein and held that the 2nd respondent was liable to stand trial for the offence punishable under Section 323 of IPC alone.

5. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, since this Court quashed offences under Sections 324, 294(b) and 506(i) of IPC in C.C. No. 2879/2016, arose out of the same sets of facts, the present case on the same facts also, the offences under Section 294(b), 506(i) and 324 of IPC are liable to be quashed and the trial may be limited in so far as the offence under Section 323 of IPC alone, so as to have parity in between the parties, who are facing trial arose out of the same occurrence, where allegations are substantially the same.

6. Opposing quashment sought for, the learned Public Prosecutor would submit that, going by the FIS, use of abusive words at the courtyard of the house of the defacto complainant and threat to kill her as well as causing hurt by using a stone by the accused are the allegations and the offences are prima facie made out. Therefore, quashment cannot be considered.

7. Perusing Annexure.A4 order, it is discernible that in paragraph No. 5, the learned Single Judge of this Court opined as under:

In my opinion, having regard to the nature of weapon used, no charge under Section 324 IPC can sustain. In order to attract an offence under the said Section, the weapon used must be for shooting, stabbing, cutting or it must be an instrument which, used as a weapon of offence, is likely to cause death etc. Having considered the facts on record, the nature of weapon used as well as the place where the simple injury was allegedly caused do not persuade me to assume that an offence punishable under Section 324 IPC could have been committed by the petitioner. In my view, at the most, the petitioner could be charged only with an offence punishable under Section 323 IPC.

8. The said finding has been given much emphasis by the learned counsel for the petitioner, while canvasing trial for Section 323 of IPC alone in the present crime, after quashing a