The court affirmed that the Board's reliance on social and counseling reports satisfied statutory requirements for trying a child as an adult under the Juvenile Justice Act.

ORDER

Devan Ramachandran, J.

The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 [for brevity, 'the Act, 2000'] was enacted drawing inspiration from the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, ratified by India on 11.12.1992. It was embedded on the imperative constitutional provisions of Article 15(3) of our Constitution, conferring powers on the State to make special provisions for children; as also on the stipulations in Articles 39(e) & (f), read with Articles 45 & 47, which enjoins the State to ensure that all needs of children are met and their basic human rights protected.

2. Though the afore Act did commendably well, increasing cases of crimes committed by children in the age group of 16 to 18 impelled a requirement for its comprehensive amendment, it being noticed that its provisions were ill-equipped to tackle child offenders in that group. This was fortified because, the data collected by the National Crime Record Bureau indicated a rise in the number of offenders in the age group of 16 to 18; particularly in categories of crimes, which are defined as being heinous. This led to the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 [for brevity, 'the Act'].

3. One of the acme provisions in the ‘Act’ relating to heinous offences committed by children in the age group of 16 to 18 is that, in certain specified circumstances and on the enumerated criteria being attracted, such offenders would be tried not as children, but as adults. The statutory provisions empower the Juvenile Justice Board [for brevity, 'the Board'], as also the Children's Court/Sessions Court in such regard.

4. The petitioner in this case was charged in the year 2022, with offences alleged to have been committed by him under Sections 354, 451, 342, 506, 376(3), 376(2)(n) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 [for brevity, 'the IPC'], along with various Sections of the provisions of Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act [for brevity, 'the POCSO Act'], when he was a mere 16 years in age. The “Board†of Alappuzha, issued the impugned order, concluding that “the petitioner had sufficient maturity to understand the act done by him and the consequences of it†[sic]; and that “since no infirmity to his mind and body is noticed, he should be tried as an adult and not as a child†[sic]. It thereupon referred the matter to the Children's Court for inquiry and this order is assailed by him as being perverse, illegal and unlawful.

5. Dr.V.N.Sankarjee – learned Counsel for the petitioner, argued that the findings of the ‘Board’ are factually impermissible, incorrect and misdirected; and that the offences alleged against his client are baseless and without any factual corroboration. He predicated that the impugned order is peremptorily void because, it has been issued by the ‘Board’ without taking the assistance of experienced Psychologists or Psycho-social Workers and other experts, as is statutorily mandated by the ‘Act’, under the proviso to Section 15 thereof. He then impelled an adscititious argument that his client obtained no other option, but to have approached this Court directly through a Revision because, the statutory Appellate provision is reduced to being nugatory in his case because, if he is to invoke it, it can only be preferred before the Court of Sessions, which would render him without the protection of the indispensable provisions of Section 19(1) of the ‘Act’, which provides for an inquiry by the ‘Children's Court’, before he can be tried as an adult. He thus prayed that the impugned order be set aside.

6. Adverting to the rather piquant legal issues that are projected for our consideration, we requested Sri.Bindu Sasthamangalam – learned Counsel of this Court, to assist us as an amicus curiae. He has made available a meticulous note, touching upon all the provisions of law; as also the precedents that cover the field, w