IMPORTANT POINT
Acquittal from criminal charges does not guarantee employment in public service if allegations involve moral turpitude or violence, allowing the Government to assess character and antecedents.

JUDGMENT :

P. Krishna Kumar, J.

The petitioner was advised by the Kerala Public Service Commission (PSC) for the post of Police Constable/Civil Police Officer in the Kerala Armed Police, 5th Battalion. However, during verification, he disclosed that he had been implicated in three criminal cases, which initially led to his non-appointment. He challenged this decision before the Kerala Administrative Tribunal, which directed the respondents to send him for training, stipulating that he would be permanently appointed only if he was acquitted of all charges. During the training period, he informed the authorities that he had been again implicated in two additional cases, following which he was retrenched from service.

2. Subsequently, the petitioner was acquitted in all the cases. However, through Ext. A13 proceedings, the Government debarred him from appointment in the Civil Police Officer cadre, citing the interdiction in Rule 10(b)(iii) of Part II of the Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules (KS&SSR). The petitioner again approached the Tribunal, contending that none of the alleged offences involved proclivity of violence or moral turpitude and that all the cases were fabricated at the behest of his neighbours. Relying on Section 86(2) of the Kerala Police Act, 2011, he claimed that he was entitled to permanent appointment and challenged Annexure A13, seeking a direction to appoint him as a Police Constable/Civil Police Officer.

3. The Tribunal rejected his claim, noting that the allegations involved physical assaults using deadly weapons. Although the cases resulted in acquittal, the Tribunal observed that it occurred when the witnesses turned hostile or when the petitioner settled the matters.

4. We have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Government Pleader.

5. The argument of the petitioner rests on two grounds. First, under Section 86(2) of the Kerala Police Act, he is entitled to appointment upon acquittal. Second, relying on the decision in Binnesh Babu v. State of Kerala (2024 (3) KHC 364), he contends that the appointment should not be declined if the alleged criminal acts do not amount to violence or moral turpitude.

6. We are unable to agree with the contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioner. From Annexure A13, it is obvious that the cases registered against the petitioner are very serious in nature, and two of them were registered even subsequent to the advice of the Public Service Commission. All the cases occurred during 2015-2019, whereas the petitioner was advised by the PSC on 20.09.2017.

7. Upon reviewing the judgments in the criminal cases, the reply statement of the State and Annexure A13, we note the following:

a) One case was quashed based on a settlement between the petitioner and the victim (Crime No. 361/2015 of Nooranad Police Station), where the court recorded that the victim had suffered a lacerated scalp injury. As per the case of the police, the injury was caused by the petitioner.

b) Another case was compounded out of court, leading to acquittal under Section 320(8) Cr.P.C (Crime No. 183/2019). According to the police, the petitioner attacked the victim with a wooden stick.

c) In the third case (Crime No. 189/2019), the occurrence witnesses turned hostile, and thus the petitioner was acquitted.

d) In Crime Nos. 1311/2012 and 1317/2012 also, the victims turned hostile, which led to the acquittal of the petitioner. In one of these cases, the prosecution alleged that the petitioner, along with several other accused persons, formed an unlawful assembly, armed with deadly weapons such as swords and iron rods, attacked the victim, and caused cut injuries and other serious injuries. In the other case, it was alleged that the petitioner stopped the victim's car by placing a motorbike across its path and then attacked the victim with a cricket bat.

8. All the above allegations are very serious in nature. Thus, we are not in a position to apply the law laid down by this Court