IMPORTANT POINT
Suspension of liquor licenses does not require notice or hearing, differing from cancellation, based on public interest and immediate action needs.

JUDGMENT :

The petitioners are licensees of certain toddy shops under the Kerala Abkari Shops Disposal Rules, 2002 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Rules’). They have approached this Court, being aggrieved by the fact that proceedings have been drawn up against them, suspending their license without affording to them any opportunity of being heard and without affording to them any opportunity to show cause against the allegations raised against them.

2. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners would submit that, in W.P.(C) Nos. 46808 of 2024 and 1308 and 1310 of 2025, the allegation that led to the suspension is that the petitioners have permitted the operation of the toddy shops in question through a benami (namely one Sreedharan) while the allegation that led to the suspension of the license of toddy shops (which is the subject matter of W.P.(C) No. 46607 of 2024 is that, certain spirit was found and it is suspected that the same was being taken to mix with the toddy to be supplied in the shops which are subject matter of W.P.(C) No.46607 of 2024.

3. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners would submit with reference to the provisions of Section 26 of the Abkari Act that Section 26(b) of the Abkari Act was specifically invoked to suspend the licenses in these cases. He further contends that even if the entire allegations are admitted, the offence is compoundable under Section 56(b) of the Abkari Act. Therefore, he vehemently contends that the suspension of the license should have been preceded by a notice even if the statutory provisions do not specifically contemplate the issuance of such notice and an opportunity to be heard. It is submitted that the rules of natural justice have to be read into the statutory provisions. It is submitted that, when the consequences of a suspension are drastic and cause economic loss and loss of livelihood to the petitioners and also to the workers, the action should have been preceded by notice and personal hearing. It is submitted that the charges upon which the power of suspension has been exercised are all flimsy grounds and if the explanations submitted by the petitioners had been considered and had they had been heard by the officer, the power of suspension would certainly not have been exercised.

4. Learned Government Pleader, on the other hand, refers to the statutory provisions and contends that where the trade in question is a trade in liquor, the petitioners enjoy no fundamental rights and their right to trade in liquor is always circumscribed by the statutory provisions. It is submitted that the power of suspension must be treated as distinct from the power of cancellation and while cancellation can only be with notice and after affording an opportunity of hearing, the power of suspension cannot be curtailed by any such requirement as there may be situations where the power of suspension has to be immediately exercised. It is submitted that, in the facts and circumstances of these cases, the power of suspension was exercised for good reason and on the petitioners submitting their explanations, the issue will be decided by the competent authority without undue delay.

5. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners would submit, in reply, that each case will have to be dealt with its own facts and while certain circumstances may arise where the power of suspension has to be exercised immediately and without having to wait for the compliance with the compliance of principles of natural justice if the circumstances of the case do not reveal that the power of suspension had to be exercised immediately, the petitioners are still entitled to contend that the power of suspension should have been exercised only with notice and after affording an opportunity of hearing to the petitioners. In support of his contention, he relied on the judgment of this Court in Banerji Memorial Club v. Dy. Commissioner of Excise; 2009 SCC OnLine Ker 3376

6. Having heard the learned counsel appearing f