The trial court must provide a detailed rationale when condoning delay in cognizance, ensuring that the reasons provided by the prosecution are sufficient and reasonable.

ORDER :

KAUSER EDAPPAGATH, J.

Annexure A3 order passed by the Grama Nyayalaya, Perinad, condoning the delay in taking cognizance of the offences against the petitioner is under challenge in this Crl.M.C.

2. The petitioner is the 5^th accused in S.T.No.1971/2017 on the files of the Grama Nyayalaya, Perinad. The offences alleged against him are punishable under Sections 323 and 341, read with Section 34 of the IPC. The prosecution allegation, in short, is that on 27.1.2013, the petitioner, along with the remaining accused, wrongfully restrained the de facto complainant and caused him bodily injury and thereby committed the offences.

3. The alleged incident took place on 27.1.2013. The final report was filed on 17.11.2016. As per Section 468 (1) of Cr.P.C, no court shall take cognizance of an offence of the category specified in sub-section (2), after the period of limitation. As per sub-section 2(b), if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year, the period of limitation is one year. The punishment prescribed for the offence under Section 323 of IPC is simple imprisonment for one year and for the offence under Section 341 of IPC is simple imprisonment for one month. No application has been filed by the investigating agency along with the final report to condone the delay. The petitioner appeared before the trial court and filed an application as CMP No.735 of 2018 to stop the proceedings under Section 258 of the Cr.P.C on the ground that taking cognizance of the offence was barred by limitation under Section 468 of Cr.P.C. Thereafter, the prosecutor filed an application under Section 473 of Cr.P.C to condone the delay. The application was opposed by the petitioner. However, it was allowed as per Annexure A3. The said order is under challenge in this Crl.M.C.

4. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Public Prosecutor. There is no appearance for the 1^st respondent/de facto complainant.

5. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that Annexure A3 order is not sustainable since it is not a speaking order. The learned counsel further submitted that no sufficient reason has been shown by the Prosecutor to condone the delay in taking cognizance of the offences.

6. As stated already, no application was filed by the investigating agency along with the final report to condone the delay. No reason has been stated in the final report for the delay. The reason shown in CMP No.78/2019 is that the investigating officer could not procure the presence of the de facto complainant to record her statement despite earnest effort. In short, the investigating officer was attributing fault on the part of the de facto complainant.

7. Section 468 Cr.P.C. places an embargo upon the court from taking cognizance of an offence after the expiry of the limitation period provided therein. Section 469 prescribes the period during which the limitation begins. Section 473 enables the court to condone delay, provided that the court is satisfied with the explanation furnished by the prosecution/complainant, and where, in the interests of justice, extension of the period of limitation is called for. The principle of condonation of delay is based on the general rule of the criminal justice system, which states that a crime never dies, as has been explained by way of the legal maxim, nullum tempus aut locus occurrit regi (lapse of time is no bar to the Crown for the purpose of it initiating proceeding against offenders). A criminal offence is considered a wrong against the State and also the society as a whole, even though the same has been committed against an individual ( Udai Shankar Awasthi v. State of U.P , JT 2013 (1) SC 539 ). It is settled that the condonation petition can be entertained, and an order can be passed at any t