2026 Supreme(Ker) 696

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
RAJA VIJAYARAGHAVAN V., K.V. JAYAKUMAR, JJ.
Suresh P.M. @ Poocha Sura S/o Madhavan – Appellant
Versus
State of Kerala – Respondent
Crl. Appeal Nos. 274, 280 of 2021, CRA (V) No. 66 of 2025
Decided On : 04-06-2026

A conviction for sexual offences against a minor requires reliable, consistent evidence. While the victim's testimony can be sufficient, material improvements or exaggerations regarding the involvement of additional accused persons render the evidence unreliable, necessitating acquittal. Statutory presumptions only apply after the primary foundational facts are proven.

Headnote:(A) Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 - Sections 5, 6, 9, 10, 11, 12, 16, 17 and 29 - Indian Penal Code, 1860 - Sections 323, 376, 376(2)(n), 376(3), 376DA, 450, 506(1) and 34 - Sexual offences against minors - Delay in lodging FIR - Presumption under Section 29, POCSO Act - Evidence of victim - Reliability - Accomplice/Abettor liability - Delay in reporting sexual offences by minors, particularly when victims are under threat or blackmail, is not fatal to the prosecution's case if satisfactorily explained by the circumstances (Paras 57, 59, 61). Under Section 29, the presumption applies only after the foundational facts of the offence are established by the prosecution (Para 63). Conviction cannot be based on moral considerations or presumptions in the absence of valid, legally admissible evidence; suspicion cannot substitute for proof (Para 80).

(B) Evidence - Testimony of victim - Corroboration - While uncorroborated testimony of a victim can form the basis of conviction if found to be of sterling quality, an exaggerated or improved version regarding the involvement of additional accused persons necessitates caution and may lead to acquittal of those specific individuals if the evidence is deemed inherently unreliable (Para 73).

(C) Abetment under POCSO Act - Intentional aiding or illegal omission - To attract Section 16, there must be evidence of intentional acts or omissions facilitating the crime; mere suspicion or lack of care without proof of conspiracy or intentional assistance is insufficient for conviction (Paras 76, 78).

Facts of the case:
A minor was allegedly subjected to repeated penetrative sexual assault by multiple individuals over a period of two years. The prosecution case involved threats of blackmail using illicit photography. Charges were framed under various sections of the penal code and the specialized children's protection act. The trial court convicted all accused persons. On appeal, the accused challenged the veracity of the victim's testimony, the significant delay in reporting the crimes, and the lack of evidence against certain participants, while the victim filed an appeal seeking stronger sentencing interpretations.

Findings of Court:
The court upheld the conviction of the primary accused based on consistent evidence of abuse but acquitted the other co-accused due to material improvements and contradictions in the victim's statements regarding their specific involvement. It rejected the plea that the delay in filing the complaint rendered the evidence entirely unreliable.

Issues: The main issues addressed were the reliability of a minor victim's delayed testimony containing improved allegations of gang involvement, the applicability of the statutory presumption of guilt, and the evidentiary requirements to establish abetment by a third party not directly involved in the physical act.

Ratio Decidendi: A conviction for serious sexual offences requires valid, coherent evidence. While the law permits the testimony of a victim to be the sole basis for conviction, such testimony must not be materially inconsistent or exaggerated. Furthermore, the reversal of the burden of proof under the special act cannot be invoked until the foundational facts regarding the incident and the specific role of the accused are established by the prosecution.

Result: Appeal of the primary accused partially allowed (conviction confirmed); appeals of other accused allowed (acquitted); victim’s appeal dismissed.