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1978 Supreme(Raj) 41

High Court Of Rajasthan
Judgename : P.D.Kudal
DELHI CLOTH AND GENERAL MILLS CO.LTD. - Appellant
Versus
MUNICIPAL COUNCIL, KOTA - Respondent
Civil Second Appeal 126 Of 1977
Decided On : 04/12/1978

Advocates Appeared:
K.K.MEHRISH, S.K.TIWARI, S.P.TYAGI, S.R.JOSHI

The jurisdiction of Civil Courts is barred when a special statute provides for the determination of a right or liability by a specially constituted tribunal.

Headnote:

MUNICIPALITIES - OCTROI - JURISDICTION OF CIVIL COURTS - BARRED - RAJASTHAN MUNICIPALITIES ACT, 1959, SECTIONS 104, 107, 143 - CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1908, SECTION 9.

Fact of the Case:

The plaintiff-appellant filed a suit in the Civil Court seeking a permanent injunction against the Municipal Council, Kota, to restrain them from realizing octroi at an enhanced rate. The plaintiff claimed that the State Government had issued a notification under Section 104 of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 1959, directing the Municipal Council to charge octroi at a concessional rate. The Municipal Council contended that the State Government had no authority to issue such a notification and that the plaintiff had already filed an appeal before the Collector under Section 143 of the Act.

Finding of the Court:

The court held that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit as the matter was barred by Section 143(1) of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 1959. The court observed that the Act had set up a forum whereby the assessment or levy of octroi could be challenged and that the plaintiff had already filed an appeal before the appellate authority.

Issues: 1. Whether the Civil Court has jurisdiction to entertain a suit challenging the assessment or levy of octroi under the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 1959? 2. Whether the State Government had the authority to issue a notification under Section 104 of the Act directing the Municipal Council to charge octroi at a concessional rate?

Ratio Decidendi: The court relied on the Supreme Court decisions in Bata Shoe Co. v. City of Jabalpur Corporation and Kamala Mills v. Bombay State to hold that the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts is barred when a special statute provides for the determination of a right or liability by a specially constituted tribunal. The court observed that the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 1959 had created a special forum for challenging the assessment or levy of octroi and that the plaintiff had already availed of this remedy by filing an appeal before the Collector.

Final Decision: The court dismissed the plaintiff's appeal and held that the suit was barred by Section 143(1) of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 1959. The court also directed that the observations made by the trial court and the lower appellate court shall not be taken into consideration by the appellate authority.

Judgment


P. D. KUDAL, J.

( 1 ) THIS civil second appeal under Section 100, Civil P. C. is directed against the judgment and decree dated 30th April, 1977, of the learned Civil Judge, Kota, whereby the judgment and decree of the learned Munsiff Court No. 3, Kota dated 23rd April, 1973 were reversed.

( 2 ) THE brief facts of the case, which are relevant for the disposal of this appeal are that the plaintiff-appellant filed a suit in the Court of the learned Munsiff and Magistrate Court No. 3, Kota on 22nd May, 1968 for a permanent injunction against the Municipal Council, Kota with the averments that the general rate for charging octroi on coal was. 05 paise per quintal according to the notification of the Government under Section 104 of the Rajas-than municipalities Act, 1959, issued in the year 1962. The plaintiff-appellant made a representation to the State Government on which the State Government on 14th Feb. 1968, issued a notification under Section 104 of the Rajas-than municipalities Act, 1959, declaring that the octroi payable by the plaintiff on coal would be. 01 paise per quintal with effect from 1st July, 1964 and onwards. The Municipal Council, Kota, however, issued a notice of demand at the rate of. 95 paise per quintal. The plaintiff-appellant claimed that the notice of demand issued by the Municipal Council, Kota is illegal and that the Municipal council be restrained by means of an injunction from realising octroi at the rate of. 05 paise per quintal instead of. 01 paise per quintal.

( 3 ) THE Municipal Council, however, contended that the State Government had no authority to issue a notification specifying the rate of octroi to be charged from the plaintiff-appellant, on the representation made by the plaintiff. The state Government, however, on 13th May, 1968, issued another notification under Section 104 of the Rajas-than Municipalities Act superseding the previous notification and fixed octroi on the coal at the rate of. 05 paise per quintal. It was also contended on behalf of the Municipal Council, Kota that when the plaintiff-appellant has already preferred an appeal before the Collector, Kota under Section 143 of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, the Civil Courts have no jurisdiction to entertain a suit of this nature. It was, therefore, contended that the proceedings before the Civil Courts are patently without jurisdiction and deserve to be quashed.

( 4 ) THE plaintiff-appellant, however, contended that the notification dated 14th feb. 1968 directing the Municipal Council to realise octroi at the concessional rate of. 01 paisa per quintal with effect from 1st July, 1964 on steam coal was within the competence of the State Government. It was also contended that though the notification purports to have been issued under Section 104 of the act, yet the notification was issued under Section 107 (5) of the Act. It was also contended that once it is held that the notification was issued under Section 107 (5) of the Act, then the contention of the defendant that no representation was made by the Municipal Council, Kota before the State Government as envisaged under Section 104 of the Act, loses all significance. It was also contended that quoting of a wrong section in the notification cannot in any way invalidate the notification. Once it is held that the State Government held the authority to issue such notification the mere fact that the notification has been issued under Section 104 instead of Section 107 (5) of the Act would not render the notification invalid. It was also contended that the principle underlying the legal maxim "omne majus continet in se minus" would apply to the facts of the present case. If the State Government has the authority to completely remove the levy of octroi on a particular article or commodity then it has also the power and authority to charge octroi at a concessional rate. It was also contended that perusal of the notification dated 14th Feb. 1968 would reveal that in the o




















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