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High Court Of Rajasthan
Judgename : D.M.Bhandari
RAGHUNATH PRASAD - Appellant
Versus
MANGI LAL - Respondent
Civil Revn. 31 Of 1957
Decided On : 03/06/1959
STAMP ACT - PROMISSORY NOTE - DEFINITION - NEGOTIABILITY - DOCUMENT EXECUTED IN A BAHT - NOT A PROMISSORY NOTE.
Fact of the Case:
The document in question was executed in a Bahi (account book) and contained a promise to pay a certain sum of money with interest. The rate of interest was not specified in the document. The plaintiff filed a suit on the document, claiming that it was a promissory note. The defendant contended that the document was not a promissory note but an agreement, and that it was not admissible in evidence without payment of penalty.
Finding of the Court:
The court held that the document was not a promissory note but an agreement. The court reasoned that the document was not negotiable because it was executed in a Bahi, and that it did not satisfy all the tests of being a promissory note under the Negotiable Instruments Act.
Issues: 1. Whether the document in question was a promissory note or an agreement? 2. Whether the document was admissible in evidence without payment of penalty?
Ratio Decidendi: 1. The court held that the document was not a promissory note because: a. It was not negotiable because it was executed in a Bahi. b. It did not satisfy all the tests of being a promissory note under the Negotiable Instruments Act, specifically the requirement that the sum payable be certain. 2. The court held that the document was admissible in evidence without payment of penalty because it was an agreement, not a promissory note.
Final Decision: The revision application was dismissed with costs.
D. M. BHANDARI, J.
( 1 ) THIS is a revision application on behalf of Raghunath Prasad defendant against the order of the Senior Civil Judge, Jaipur City, dated 9-1-1957 holding that the document dated 2-4-1953 executed by the defendant in favour of the plaintiff Mangilal was not a promissory note but was an agreement and could be admitted in evidence after the payment of penalty. The defendant made an application to the trial court that he wanted to file a revision application in this Court and that the document may not be admitted in evidence and it has not yet been admitted in evidence.
( 2 ) I am very doubtful whether a revision application against the order determining the nature of the document for the purpose of the Stamp Act can be filed under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code. There is no question of jurisdiction involved in this case as the learned Senior Civil Judge had jurisdiction to decide the nature of the document for the purpose of the Stamp Act. As to the application of Sub-section (c) of Section 115, there are series of decisions of their Lordships of the Privy Council which all lay down the law that if a court has jurisdiction to decide a case and even if it decided wrongly, it cannot be said that it has exercised jurisdiction illegally or with material irregulariy. Reference in this connection may be made to the cases of Amir Hassan Khan v. Sheo Baksh Singh, 11 Ind App 237 (PC), Balkrishna Udayar v. Vasudeva Aiyar, 44 Ind App 261: (AIR 1917 PC 71), Venkatagiri Ayyangar v. Hindu Religious Endowments Board, Madras, 76 Ind App 67; (AIR 1949 PC 156) and Joy Chand Lal v. Kamalakslia Chaudhury, 76 Ind App 131: (AIR 1949 PC 239 ). In Joy Chands case, 76 Ind App 131: (AIR 1949 PC 239) it was pointed out that an error in decision of the subordinate court does not by itself involve that the subordinate court had acted illegally Or with material irregularity so as to justify interference in revision under Sub-section (c) of Section US but if as a result of such error in the decision the subordinate court exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law or failed to exercise jurisdiction so vesed a case for revision under Sub-section (a) or sub-section (b) may arise. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court also considered Section 115 C. P. C. in the case of Keshardeo v. Radha Kissen. 1953 SCR 136: (AIR 1953 SC 23) and after citing the Privy Council cases, referred to the case of Nagpur High Court in the case of Narayan Sonaji v. Sheshrao Vithoba, ILR (1948) Nag 16: (AIR 1948 Nag 258) (FB), wherein it was said that the words illegally and material irregularity do not cover either errors of fact or law. Their Lordships further observed as follow: "they do not refer to the decision arrived at but to the manner in which it is reached.The errors contemplated relate to material defects of procedure and not to errors of either law or fact after the formalities which the law prescribes have been complied with. "
( 3 ) THE above authorities in my humble opinion clearly lay down the limits under which Section 115 C. P. C. can be applied. As pointed out in Balakrishna Udayars rase, 44 Ind App 261: (AIR 1917 PC 71) this section is not directed against the conclusions of law or fact in which the question of jurisdiction is not involved. But there is an authority of this Court in the case of Brijraj Sharan v. Sahu Raghunandan, ILR (1955) 5 Raf 367: ( (S) AIR 1955 Raj 85) in which such a revision application was entertained and accepted. I do not think it is open to me sitting as a single Judge to take a contrary view. I also do not think that I should refer the matter to a larger bench as in my view the revision application fails on merits.
( 4 ) I, therefore, proceed to decide the revision application on merits.
( 5 ) TRANSLATED into English the relevant portion of the document runs thus:
"account one of Raghunath Prasad J. Silawat of Jaipur. Rs. 30167/4/6 carried forward as balance due under the old Account. Miti Fi
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