1953 Supreme(Raj) 161

HIGH COURT OF RAJASTHAN
WANCHOO, RANAWAT, JJ.
Dholpur Co-Operative Transport and Multi Purpose Union Ltd.
Versus
Appellate Authority Rajasthan
Misc. Writ Appln. No.80 of 1953
Decided On : 28-08-1953

Headnote:

MOTOR VEHICLES ACT - RULES FRAMED UNDER THE ACT - VALIDITY - AMENDMENT OF RULES - WHETHER REQUIRES TO BE PLACED BEFORE THE LEGISLATURE - ORDER OF APPELLATE AUTHORITY - MALA FIDE - WHETHER CAN BE CHALLENGED BY WRIT OF CERTIORARI - SCOPE OF WRIT OF CERTIORARI - APPEAL UNDER S.64(A) - POWER OF APPELLATE AUTHORITY TO CANCEL PERMITS - ERROR OF LAW APPARENT ON THE FACE OF THE RECORD - MEANING - IRRELEVANT CONSIDERATIONS - WHETHER CAN BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT BY APPELLATE AUTHORITY - CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE ACT - WHETHER CAN BE CHALLENGED ON THE GROUND OF UNREASONABLENESS OR ARBITRARINESS - ART.19(6) AND ART.14 OF THE CONSTITUTION - SCOPE.

Fact of the Case:

The applicant, a limited company desirous of running buses on the Dholpur-Agra route, applied for permits under the Motor Vehicles Act. The Regional Transport Authority granted two permits to the applicant and four permits to another association. The applicant's appeal to the Appellate Authority was allowed and one permit each was granted to two other persons, while the two permits granted to the applicant were cancelled. The applicant challenged the order of the Appellate Authority by way of a writ petition under Art.226 of the Constitution.

Finding of the Court:

1. The rules framed under the Motor Vehicles Ordinance No.14 of 1950, which came into force from 30-3-1951, were valid, even though they were not placed before the Legislature when it met, for the first time, in March, 1952, as the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, had been applied to Rajasthan by the Part B States (Laws) Act (No.3) of 1951, and S.6 of the Act continued in force the rules which had been made in Rajasthan on 30-3-1951. 2. The amendment in R.76, by which the Appellate Authority was reconstituted, was not invalid on the ground that it was not placed before the Legislature as soon as possible after it was made and for the requisite period of 14 days, as the amendment was placed before the Legislature on 25-2-1953. 3. The order of the Appellate Authority was not mala fide, and there was no reason for holding that the order was mala fide against the Chairman of the Appellate Authority. 4. The Appellate Authority had jurisdiction to determine questions of limitation, and locus standi, and the decision of the Appellate Authority on these issues could not be challenged by a writ of certiorari. 5. On an appeal under S.64(a), the Appellate Authority had the power to grant relief to the appellant by grant of a permit, but did not have any jurisdiction to cancel the permit granted to another person, unless a foundation had been laid before the Regional Transport Authority for an appeal provided by Cl.(f) by an objection by somebody entitled to appeal under that clause. 6. The error of law envisaged in a writ of certiorari should be so patent that a bare perusal of the judgment and the record on which it is based would show that there was error. Where two views, are, however, possible, or where the decision as to whether there is error of law can only be arrived at after long arguments such error cannot the called error of law apparent on the face of the record. 7. The Appellate Authority could take into account other allied matters, such as whether a certain applicant was an old operator or whether his father was an old operator at one time, in deciding between one applicant and another, provided these were all in the interest of the public. 8. The Motor Vehicles Act was not unconstitutional inasmuch as it infringed the fundamental right of the applicant under Art.19(1)(g) to carry on any occupation, trade or business, and the restrictions imposed were saved by cl.(6).

Issues: 1. Whether the rules framed under the Motor Vehicles Ordinance No.14 of 1950 were valid, even though they were not placed before the Legislature when it met, for the first time, in March, 1952? 2. Whether the amendment in R.76, by which the Appellate Authority was reconstituted, was invalid on the ground that it was not placed before the Legislature as soon as possible after it was made and for the requisite period of 14 days? 3. Whether the order of the Appellate Authority was mala fide? 4. Whether the Appellate Authority had jurisdiction to determine questions of limitation, and locus standi? 5. Whether, on an appeal under S.64(a), the Appellate Authority had the power to grant relief to the appellant by grant of a permit, but did not have any jurisdiction to cancel the permit granted to another person? 6. Whether the error of law envisaged in a writ of certiorari should be so patent that a bare perusal of the judgment and the record on which it is based would show that there was error? 7. Whether the Appellate Authority could take into account other allied matters, such as whether a certain applicant was an old operator or whether his father was an old operator at one time, in deciding between one applicant and another? 8. Whether the Motor Vehicles Act was unconstitutional inasmuch as it infringed the fundamental right of the applicant under Art.19(1)(g) to carry on any occupation, trade or business?

Ratio Decidendi: 1. The rules framed under the Motor Vehicles Ordinance No.14 of 1950 were valid, even though they were not placed before the Legislature when it met, for the first time, in March, 1952, as the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, had been applied to Rajasthan by the Part B States (Laws) Act (No.3) of 1951, and S.6 of the Act continued in force the rules which had been made in Rajasthan on 30-3-1951. 2. The amendment in R.76, by which the Appellate Authority was reconstituted, was not invalid on the ground that it was not placed before the Legislature as soon as possible after it was made and for the requisite period of 14 days, as the amendment was placed before the Legislature on 25-2-1953. 3. The order of the Appellate Authority was not mala fide, and there was no reason for holding that the order was mala fide against the Chairman of the Appellate Authority. 4. The Appellate Authority had jurisdiction to determine questions of limitation, and locus standi, and the decision of the Appellate Authority on these issues could not be challenged by a writ of certiorari. 5. On an appeal under S.64(a), the Appellate Authority had the power to grant relief to the appellant by grant of a permit, but did not have any jurisdiction to cancel the permit granted to another person, unless a foundation had been laid before the Regional Transport Authority for an appeal provided by Cl.(f) by an objection by somebody entitled to appeal under that clause. 6. The error of law envisaged in a writ of certiorari should be so patent that a bare perusal of the judgment and the record on which it is based would show that there was error. Where two views, are, however, possible, or where the decision as to whether there is error of law can only be arrived at after long arguments such error cannot the called error of law apparent on the face of the record. 7. The Appellate Authority could take into account other allied matters, such as whether a certain applicant was an old operator or whether his father was an old operator at one time, in deciding between one applicant and another, provided these were all in the interest of the public. 8. The Motor Vehicles Act was not unconstitutional inasmuch as it infringed the fundamental right of the applicant under Art.19(1)(g) to carry on any occupation, trade or business, and the restrictions imposed were saved by cl.(6).

Final Decision: The writ petition was allowed in part. The order of the Appellate Authority cancelling the permits granted to the applicant was quashed, while the rest of the order granting permits to Satnarainsingh and Khazansingh was upheld.