JUDGMENT

Pradeep Nandrajog, C.J. - The question referred to the Full Bench is whether the provisions of Section 17B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ''the Act'') have no application in the proceedings of a pending writ petition filed by the Management arising out of an order passed by an Industrial Fora rejecting the application of the employer under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act.

2. Currently there is a Division Bench judgment of this Court reported as (2009) 2 LLN 361, Karan Singh vs. Authorised Disciplinary Authority, RSRTC, where the view taken is that Section 17B of the Act would apply.

3. We find that there is a divergence of opinion amongst various High Courts on this issue.

4. In the decision reported as (2005) 120 DLT 664, Delhi Transport Corporation vs. Jagdish Chander, a Full Bench of the Delhi High Court held that Section 17B of the said Act would be applicable. From a perusal of paras 9 to 35 of the decision the legal position could be culled out as follows: The High Court observed that the legislative object of the Industrial Disputes Act is to provide definite protection to the workmen against any exploitation. Further, Section 17B needs liberal interpretation and it is a beneficial legislation enacted for protection of the workman against exploitation resulting from prolonged litigation which is stretched by the affluent employer. The provisions further show the liability created by statute upon an employer for payment of such wages. It was further observed that the expressions ''Award'' and ''Industrial Dispute'' have been widely worded so as to take within their ambit disputes between the employer and the workmen. It was further observed that a determination under Section 33(2) (b) is a question relating to employment or non-employment. It was further held that there is complete and final determination by the Tribunal while deciding an application under Section 32(2)(b). Furthermore, workmen are entitled to consequences of reinstatement pursuant to an Order passed under Section 33(2) (b) or an Award passed under Section 10 of the Act. The term ''award'' should be read in complete conjunction with the direction for reinstatement and an order passed under Section 33(2)(b) would by necessary implication, incorporate a direction as in law that the services of the workman were never terminated. Therefore, an order which is passed upon complete determination and after proceedings should be related and construed as a part of expression ''award directing reinstatement'' having all attributes that of an award. It was also held that emphasis of legislature in relation to Section 17B is on reinstatement rather than on an ''award''. It was also observed that Section 17B, either expressly or impliedly or by compulsive interpretation, does not indicate that the law-makers intended to exclude an order under Section 33(2) (b) from the purview of the said section and confine it only to an ''award'' in its strict sense. The principle of exclusion can be applied where it is explicitly stated in the statute. It was further observed that merely because the scope of jurisdiction exercisable by a Tribunal in passing an award under Section 10 and an order under Section 33(2)(b) has some noticeable differences, should not be treated as paramount consideration for giving narrower interpretation to the provisions of a statute, particularly when such a restricted interpretation may defeat the very intent and object the legislation. It was further observed that an interpretation which would help in avoiding multiplicity of litigation should be more acceptable to the one which would generate more litigation''s.

5. In the decision reported as (1987) 55 FLR 490, Samser Ali vs. Kesoram Industies & Cotton Mills Ltd., a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court also took a similar view and the ratio which can be culled out from paras 18 and 19 of the decision would be: That an order made under Section 33(2)(b) of t