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2005 Supreme(Del) 133

High Court Of Delhi
DELHI TRANSPORT CORPORATION - Appellant
Versus
JAGDISH CHANDER - Respondent
W.P.(C) : 3871 of 2000
Decided On : 02/03/2005

Advocates Appeared:
Ataul Haque, Jyoti Singh, M.TAIYAB KHAN, Raj Birbal, Vibhu Shankar, VINAY SABHARWAL

The provisions of Section 17-B of the Industrial Disputes Act should be interpreted liberally and benevolently so as to achieve the social goal specified in the enactment itself.

Headnote:

INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT - SECTION 17 (B) - APPLICABILITY - ORDER REJECTING APPROVAL UNDER SECTION 33 (2) (B) - WHETHER AN AWARD - LIBERAL INTERPRETATION - LEGISLATIVE INTENT - OBJECTS AND REASONS - SOCIAL WELFARE LEGISLATION - DOCTRINE OF DE FACTO - DIVERGENT VIEWS - LARGER BENCH REFERENCE - LEGISLATIVE AMENDMENTS - SECTION 2 (S) - WORKMAN - SOCIALISTIC STATE - SECTION 11 - SECTION 17B - SECTION 33 (2) (B) - SECTION 2 (B) - AWARD - SECTION 2 (K) - INDUSTRIAL DISPUTE - SECTION 31 - SECTION 33A - ARTICLE 141 - ARTICLE 142 - SECTION 25F - SECTION 25B - SECTION 2 (OO) - SECTION 17A - SECTION 29A - SECTION 10 (1) (C) - SECTION 10 - SECTION 2 (A) - SECTION 34 - ARTICLE 226 - SECTION 109 - CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908.

Fact of the Case:

The workman was appointed as a conductor with the Delhi Transport Corporation. The management served a charge-sheet upon him on the ground of misconduct and after an inquiry, he was removed from service. The Corporation also filed an application for approval under Section 33 (2) (b) of the Industrial Disputes Act before the Industrial Tribunal, Delhi. The application was contested by the workman and after affording the parties an opportunity to complete their pleadings and lead evidence in support thereof, vide its order dated 19.8.99, the application of the Corporation was rejected by the Tribunal. The Corporation challenged the order of the Tribunal by way of a writ petition. During the pendency of the writ petition, the workman filed an application under Section 17-B of the Industrial Disputes Act for payment of full salary to the workman till such time the writ petition was pending in the Court.

Finding of the Court:

The Court held that the provisions of Section 17-B of the Industrial Disputes Act will be applicable in a case where the management in the writ petition has challenged the order of the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal whereby its application under Section 33 (2) (b) of the Act seeking approval of the order of dismissal was dismissed by such Court or Tribunal, subject to the conditions stated in Section 17b itself.

Issues: Whether the provisions of Section 17-B of the Industrial Disputes Act will be applicable in a case where the management in the writ petition has challenged the order of the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal whereby its application under Section 33 (2) (b) of the Act seeking approval of the order of dismissal was dismissed by such Court or Tribunal.

Ratio Decidendi: The Court held that the provisions of Section 17-B of the Industrial Disputes Act should be interpreted liberally and benevolently so as to achieve the social goal specified in the enactment itself. The Court also held that the expression 'award' under Section 2 (b) is incapable of being given a restricted or a limited meaning. The Court further held that the order passed by the Industrial Tribunal under Section 33 (2) (b) of the Act, particularly where it rejects the application of the management, becomes operative forthwith and as per settled law, no further order is required to be passed and the workman continues to be in service.

Final Decision: The Court answered the question in the affirmative and held that the provisions of Section 17-B of the Industrial Disputes Act will be applicable in a case where the management in the writ petition has challenged the order of the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal whereby its application under Section 33 (2) (b) of the Act seeking approval of the order of dismissal was dismissed by such Court or Tribunal, subject to the conditions stated in Section 17b itself.

Swatanter Kumar, J.

( 1 ) THE law whether legislatively enacted or which finds its origin from the predicated judicial pronouncements, commonly known as Judge made law, is essentially mutable and progressive. It normally tilts in favour of the need of the developing society while keeping in view the object sought to be achieved by the provisions of a given statute. Absolute, strict or rigid interpretation of law can some time cause results which may not be conducive for the attainment of social goal by enforcement of the provisions of the Act. This concept is applicable with greater emphasis to social welfare legislations. Peter Muller said what is lasting is not what resists time but wisely changes with it. Often it is said that law must be understood and implemented in its correct prespective keeping in mind the constitutional mandate, attainment of ultimate legislative object and ends of justice. A legislation with its limitations reflects the vision of the society, the law makers and its enforceability is the foundation of its acceptance. Provisions of any Act, is a vision, without the ability to execute for the benefit of the section of the society for which it is enacted, is probably a hallucination. Sometimes the Courts in order to meet the need of public policy and welfare, materially take into consideration and rest their judgment on de facto doctrine. Diversified approach to a social problem within the limitation of the statutory provisions on rare occasion leads to divergent views being expressed by the Courts causing statement in effective and proper application of law by different quarters of the State Administration as well as judicial hierarchy. Divergent opinions per se are not adverse to the administration of justice. Divergent opinions in fact provide the foundation for development of law by reference to a Larger Bench. Exercise of such jurisdiction is an accepted norm in order to maintain consistency in law and judicial discipline.

( 2 ) A Division Bench of this Court in LPA No. 361/2002 took the view that the provision of Section 17 (b) of the Industrial Disputes Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) has no application in the proceedings of a pending writ petition arising from an order of the Industrial Tribunal rejecting the application of the employer under Section 33 (2) of the Act. This view was divergent to the view taken by another Division Bench of the Court in an earlier LPA No. 426/ 2001 holding that an application under Section 17 (b) of the Act would be maintainable in the cases of the present kind. Placed in this situation S. K. Mahajan, J. (as His Lordship then was) vide his order dated 9th April, 2003 in wp (C) No. 3871/2000 referred the question in the present writ petition to a larger Bench. The order of reference reads as under: "along with the counter-affidavit the respondent workman had filed an affidavit under Section 17-B of the Industrial Disputes Act for payment of full salary to the workman till such_time the writ petition was pending in this court. In reply to the affidavit of the respondent under Section 17-B of the Act, it is submitted by learned Counsel for the petitioner that the application under section 17-B was not maintainable inasmuch as no award directing reinstatement of the workman was challenged by the management. It is submitted that it is only in case an award directing reinstatement of the workman is challenged by the management that the Court has the power to direct payment of last drawn wages to the workman during the pendency of the proceedings before the High court. While learned Counsel for the respondent has placed reliance upon the judgment of this Court in LPA No. 361/2002 decided on 25th September, 2002 to contend that in a case of this nature provisions of Section 17-B have no application, learned Counsel for the respondent workman has relied upon the judgment of this Court in LPA No. 426/2001 decided on December 6, 2001 to contend that the application u







































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