The court can quash proceedings under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. in cases involving offences under the provisions of SC/ST Act based on a genuine compromise between the parties, as established by the legal position in the case of Ramawatar.

JUDGMENT

Dinesh Mehta, J. - By way of this criminal misc. petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the accused-petitioners have approached this Court with a prayer to quash the proceedings in Sessions Case No. 89/2021 pending before the Court of Special Judge SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities Cases), Udaipur seeking petitioners' prosecution for the offences punishable under Sections 323, 504, 506 & 452 of IPC and under Sections 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s), 3(2)(va) of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (hereinafter referred to as the 'SC/ST Act').

2. The brief facts are that on the First Information Report lodged by the complainant-respondent, after investigation charge-sheet for the aforesaid offences was filed against the accused-petitioners and on that basis above said criminal proceedings in Case No. 89/2021 were initiated.

3. During the trial, both the parties filed an application under Section 320 of Cr.P.C. to permit compounding of the aforesaid offences.

4. The trial Court partly allowed the application and permitted to compound the offences under Sections 323, 504 & 506 of IPC vide order dated 22.08.2022 but the prayer in respect of offences under Section 452 IPC and Sections 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s), 3(2)(va) of SC/ST Act was refused, as the same are not compoundable.

5. Learned counsel for the complainant while accepting the factum of compromise submits that the complainant has no objection if the proceedings in question are quashed.

6. Learned Public Prosecutor submits that since the FIR has been registered under the provisions of SC/ST Act, the FIR/proceedings cannot be quashed on the basis of compromise. He, however, accepts the factum of compromise having been entered into without coercion and duress.

7. In order to support his contention that FIR/proceedings under the provisions of SC/ST Act can be quashed, learned counsel for the petitioner invites Court's attention towards the order dated 25.10.2021 passed by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ramawatar v. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in AIR 2021 SC 5228.

8. In the above referred case of Ramawatar (supra), Hon'ble the Supreme Court has observed thus:

"12. In view of the settled proposition of law, we affirm the decision of this Court in Ramgopal (Supra) and reiterate that the powers of this Court under Article 142 can be invoked to quash a criminal proceeding on the basis of a voluntary compromise between the complainant/victim and the accused.

13. We, however, put a further caveat that the powers under Article 142 or under Section 482 Cr.P.C., are exercisable in post conviction matters only where an appeal is pending before one or the other Judicial forum. This is on the premise that an order of conviction does not attain finality till the accused has exhausted his/her legal remedies and the finality is subjudice before an appellate court. The pendency of legal proceedings, be that may before the final Court, is sine qua non to involve the superior court's plenary powers to do complete justice. Conversely, where a settlement has ensued post the attainment of all legal remedies, the annulment of proceedings on the basis of a compromise would be impermissible. Such an embargo is necessitated to prevent the accused from gaining an indefinite leverage, for such a settlement/compromise will always be loaded with lurking suspicion about its bona fide. We have already clarified that the purpose of these extraordinary powers is not to incentivise any hollow hearted agreements between the accused and the victim but to do complete justice by effecting genuine settlement(s).

14. With respect to the second question before us, it must be noted that ven though the powers of this Court under Article 142 are wide and far reaching, the same cannot be exercised in a vacuum. True it is that ordinary statutes or any restrictions contained therein, cannot be constructed as a limitation on the Court's power to do "complete justice". However, thi