The doctrine of delay and laches can result in the denial of discretionary power and the loss of remedies, based on public policy and utility.

JUDGMENT

1. Instant petition has been filed by the petitioner against the order dated 08.03.2022 passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Jaipur Bench-Jaipur (for short 'the Tribunal').

2. The petitioner submitted Original Application before the Tribunal with the following prayer:-

"(i) the respondents may be directed to treat the regular service of the applicant from her date of initial appointment i.e 16.06.1981 or from the date of first D.P.C. i.e 27.08.1982 or from the date of second D.P.C held in the year 1985 and counting qualifying service for the purpose of granting A.C.P and M.A.C.P. and further for the purpose of all consequential benefits including pension and gratuity.

(ii) The respondents may be directed to re-fix the pay of the applicant in the pay scale given to the other Lab. Technicians working in the other central Government departments including C.G.H.S as recommended by 5th and 6th pay commission report and accepted by the Central Government. All consequential benefits including arrear of pay and allowances may also be allowed to the applicant.

(iii) Grant such other and further reliefs which are expedient in favour of the applicant.

(iv) Cost of the OA may be awarded in favour of the humble applicant."

3. After hearing the counsel for the parties, the Tribunal rejected the Original Application by observing thus:-

"After going through the pleadings and hearing the arguments of the learned counsels of both the parties, it is clear that the claim of the applicant, for change in the date of her entitlement of ACP and MACP, is based on the premise that the date of her appointment is not in the year 1989, but in 1981, when she was initially engaged as outsider Laboratory Technician (or when the Selection Committee/DPC cleared her for regular appointment in the year 1982 or in 1987). These claims, which are being raised almost 3 decades after the appointment (as these relate to the date of appointment), almost one and a half decade after the grant of first ACP, and almost a decade after the grant of MACP, are prima-facie barred by period of limitation. The claims, therefore, deserve to be rejected on that account alone. However, we are going into the merits of the claim, on account of the applicant claiming it to be causing a continuing loss, and also in order to avoid multiplicity of litigation in case a contrary view is taken by a higher court. The learned counsel for the respondents argued that the very fact that she is asking for three dates, with reference to which to consider her eligibility for grant of ACP/MACP benefit (years 1981, 1982 or 1985) shows how vague her prayer for relief is. It is difficult to disagree with this argument. By seeking relief from 3 different dates, it is clear that the applicant is not sure about her own claim and is using this OA as a kind of fishing exercise to get whatever she can get in this regard.

Since the counting of the period of ACP/MACP always starts with the date of appointment, there could still be some scope for arguing to get the relief from the date of alleged initial appointment. However, there can be no justification for claiming it from the date of the decision of a Selection Committee/DPC to recommend a person's appointment. Again, if, for the sake of arguments, it was to be considered that it was not a Selection Committee but a Departmental promotion Committee, the selection of the applicant would be considered a promotion, and it would, for the very same reason, be a benefit to be counted for not granting the time bound promotion benefit like ACP (which is given only when a person gets no promotion during a period). The only reason to give some credence to the applicant's claim is the mention, in Annexure A./4, about treating another person, Mrs. Kusum Geoerge, who is said to have been recommended for selection by a DPC held in the year 1985, a junior to the applicant in rank. However, in the absence of any other, more direct and substantive evidence to prove