The statutory powers of the Gram Panchayat to take action against land encroachers and the need for citizens to have a valid title over the land to interfere with such actions.

JUDGMENT

Dinesh Mehta, J. - By way of the present writ petition, petitioner has challenged order dated 10.02.2022, passed by Additional District Judge, Phalodi, District Jodhpur (hereinafter referred to as to the 'Appellate Court'), whereby petitioner's appeal against the order dated 28.01.2022, passed by Civil Judge, Phalodi (hereinafter referred to as "the Trial Court") has been rejected.

2. The facts germane for the present purposes are that the plaintiff (petitioner herein) had filed a suit for permanent injunction, along with an application under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2, asserting that the petitioner is having settled possession over the land mentioned in Para No. 1 of the plaint situated in Khasra No. 694 of village Bawdi Kala.

3. It was argued on behalf of the petitioner that petitioner has raised construction over the land only after obtaining no objection certificate from Gram Panchayat; petitioner is having an electricity connection over the subject property and that the notice issued by the Gram Panchayat for removing the encroachment is not valid as the resolution allegedly adopted bears forged signature of Manohar Singh.

4. The Gram Panchayat disputed the facts and opposed the suit and Temporary Injunction application by filing a reply. The said application for Temporary Injunction was rejected by the trial Court with observation that the petitioner was having efficacious remedy available under Section 61 of the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 and that the electricity connection that has been relied upon by the petitioner is in the name of his brother Moti Singh and thus prima facie the petitioner has failed to make out a case against the respondent.

5. Petitioner's plaint/application for Temporary Injunction also contained arguments regarding irreparable injury in relation whereof, while rejecting the Temporary Injunction application vide order dated 28.01.2022, the Trial Court observed that the plaintiff has in fact trespassed over the public land, which is otherwise required for over-all development of the village.

6. The petitioner thereafter preferred an appeal against order of the trial Court under Order XLIII Rule 1(r) of Code of Civil Procedure, which too was dismissed by the learned Appellate Court vide its order dated 10.02.2022.

7. Various submissions were made before the Appellate Court including filing of FIR by the rival parties. It was also argued before the Appellate Court that a person cannot be evicted without following due process of law. The Appellate Court, however, rejected the appeal. It is to be noted that trial Court as well as the Appellate Court have observed while rejecting the request of temporary injunction that the petitioner has only sought an injunction without seeking a declaration.

8. Mr. Ballani, learned counsel for the petitioner, challenging the order passed by the Courts below argued that the petitioner is indisputably having long possession over the subject land and he is residing in the house constructed upon such land.

9. Learned counsel relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble the Supreme Court rendered in case of Rame Gowda (D) by Lrs. v. M. Varadappa Naidu (D) by Lrs. and Ors. (2004) 1 SCC 769.

10. While submitting that a person cannot be dispossessed without adopting due process of law, learned counsel argued that the resolution which purportedly has been adopted by the Gram Panchayat, was irregular, inasmuch as, one Panch-Manohar Singh, whose signature has been shown on the resolution, has himself lodged an FIR against the Sarpanch and other ward members alleging that the signature on said resolution has been forged and the resolution is illegal.

11. On the basis of such facts, learned counsel argued that the resolution, which has led to issuance of notice under Rule 165 of Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Rules, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as the "Rules of 1996") itself was improper. It was also contended that the proceedings for dispossessing the petitioner being adopted by the responde