The central legal point established in the judgment is that prolonged incarceration militates against the fundamental right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution, and bail can be granted based on custody period and the delay in trial.

ORDER :

1. This application for bail under Section 439 Cr.P.C. has been filed by the petitioner who has been arrested in connection with FIR No. 12/2019 registered at Police Station Lalgarh Jattan, District Sri Ganganagar, for offences under Sections 8/22 and 8/29 of the NDPS Act.

2. As per the prosecution, during routine patrolling, police team of Police Station Lalgarh Jattan, District Sri Ganganagar, on 11.01.2019, recovered 25000 tablets of Tramadol Hydrochloride (Trio-SR) from conscious possession of the present petitioner. He was arrested on the spot.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner is in custody since 11.01.2019. It was also submitted that trial against the petitioner has commenced but in last more than 4 years and 9 months, out of total 13 cited prosecution witnesses, only 4 have been examined till date. Learned counsel submitted that the delay in trial before the competent criminal court is not at all attributable to the present petitioner.

4. Learned counsel submitted that in view of the fact that the petitioner is in custody for last more than 4 years and 9 months and the delay in trial is not attributable to him, he deserves to be enlarged on bail.

5. In support of his contentions, learned counsel placed reliance on the order dated 13.07.2023 passed by Hon’ble the Supreme Court in the case of Rabi Prakash vs. State of Odisha (Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No. 4169/2023), wherein Hon’ble the Supreme Court held as under:

“3. We are informed that the trial has commenced but only 1 out of the 19 witnesses has been examined. The conclusion of trial will, thus, take some more time.

4. As regard to the twin conditions contained in Section 37 of the NDPS Act, learned counsel for the respondent-State has been duly heard. Thus, the 1st condition stands complied with. So far as the 2nd condition re: formation of opinion as to whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that the petitioner is not guilty, the same may not be formed at this stage when he has already spent more than three and a half years in custody. The prolonged incarceration, generally militates against the most precious fundamental right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution and in such a situation, the conditional liberty must override the statutory embargo created under Section 37(1)(b)(ii) of the NDPS Act.”

6. Per contra, learned Public Prosecutor has vehemently opposed the bail application and submitted that petitioner is facing trial for the offences under the NDPS Act and, therefore, the present bail application deserves to be rejected straightway. Learned Public Prosecutor, however, was not in position to refute the fact that in last 4 years and 9 months, out of total 13 cited prosecution witnesses, only 4 witnesses have been examined till date.

7. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Public Prosecutor. Perused the material available on record.

8. Hon’ble the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India vs. K.A. Najeeb, (2021) 3 SCC 713, while dealing with the cases where fetters are placed on Court’s power to grant bail and the trial has not been completed within a reasonable time, observed as under:

“17. It is thus clear to us that the presence of statutory restrictions like Section 43-D(5) of the UAPA per se does not oust the ability of the constitutional courts to grant bail on grounds of violation of Part – III of the Constitution. Indeed, both the restrictions under a statute as well as the powers exercisable under constitutional jurisdiction can be well harmonised. Whereas at commencement of proceedings, the courts are expected to appreciate the legislative policy against grant of bail but the rigours of such provisions will melt down where there is no likelihood of trial being completed within a reasonable time and the period of incarceration already undergone has exceeded a substantial part of the prescribed sentence. Such an approach would safeguard against the possibility of provisio