The limitation for appeals under the Rajasthan Minor Mineral Concession Rules is calculated from the date of communication of the order, not the date of the order itself.

ORDER

1. Instant writ petition lays challenge to the order dated 16.04.2021, passed by Appellate Authority, whereby, petitioner's appeal against the order dated 05.09.2018 passed by the respondent No.3, has been rejected on the ground of delay.

2. For the purpose of narration of facts, suffice it to mention that the petitioner had preferred an appeal under Rule 63(4) of the Rajasthan Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 2017 (hereinafter referred as "the Rules of 2017") against the order dated 05.09.2018 passed by the Assistant Mining Engineer, Balesar.

3. The above appeal was filed on 15.03.2021 alongwith an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

4. The Appellate Authority rejected petitioner's appeal on the ground of limitation inter alia observing that the appellant (petitioner herein) was required to file the appeal within a period of six months from the date of order.

5. Mr. Vyas, learned counsel for the petitioner, argued that the rejection of petitioner's appeal by the Appellate Authority vide its order dated 16.04.2021 was clearly contrary to facts and law involved in the present case.

6. He argued that the period of limitation begins from the date of receipt/communication of the order and since the order under challenge was never communicated, the appeal could not have been dismissed on the ground of delay.

7. Learned counsel for petitioner relied upon the judgment dated 11.05.2018 passed by a coordinate Bench of this Court, deciding a bunch of writ petitions led by SBCWP No.14920/2017 (Madan Lal Vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors.) in order to support his contention that the Appellate Authority is required to count the period of six months from the date of communication of the order.

8. Mr. Jasol, learned counsel appearing for the respondent-state argued that the Appellate Authority was justified in rejecting petitioner's appeal, because the same was filed belatedly, that too beyond the maximum condonable period of six months.

9. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and upon perusal of the material on record, this Court finds that the impugned order passed by the Appellate Authority is unreasoned besides being contrary to statutory provision of Rule 63 (4) of the Rules of 2017, which is being reproduced herein under:-

"63. Appeal. - (1) Any person aggrieved by any order of the Superintending Mining Engineer, Superintending Mining Engineer (Vigilance), Mining Engineer, Mining Engineer (Vigilance), Assistant Mining Engineer or Assistant Mining Engineer (Vigilance) passed under these rules shall have the right of appeal to the Additional Director Mines authorized by the Government.

(2) Any person aggrieved by any order passed in appeal under sub-rule (1) or any other order passed by the Director or Additional Director Mines under these rules shall have the right of appeal to the Government.

(3) Every appeal shall be made in Form -29 in duplicate and shall be accompanied by a fee of rupees five thousand.

(4) An appeal shall be filed within three months of the date of communication of the order appealed against:

Provided that an appeal may be admitted after the said period if the appellate authority is satisfied that the appellant has sufficient cause for not filing the appeal within the said period but the appeal shall not be admitted after expiry of six month from the date of order appealed against."

10. It is to be noted that the proviso to sub rule (4) of Rule 63 provides the Appellate Authority possesses the power to admit an appeal even after expiry of the period of three months from the date of communication of the order, however, before the expiry of the period of six months.

11. A look at the impugned order reveals that the Appellate Authority has rejected the appeal by simply observing that more than six months' period has since passed, from the date of impugned order (05.09.2018), without ascertaining as to when the order under appeal was served.

12. In the opinion of this Court, the statutory provisions, so also judgm