IMPORTANT POINT
Judicial review under Section 482 Cr.P.C. allows expunging adverse remarks if natural justice is violated and such remarks are not essential for the case.

ORDER :

"10. Before switching to examine the legality and propriety of the strictures passed against the petitioner by the learned Sessions Judge in its judgment dated 06.01.2014, the twin questions of great significance have cropped up for judicial scrutiny, i.e., (i) Whether inherent powers can be exercised by this Court for expunging the adverse remarks made against an individual including a police officer?, and (ii) Under what circumstances such power of judicial review can be exercised? For eliciting answer to both the questions, I feel inclined to examine them in the light of facts of the case and the legal precedents on which reliance is placed by the learned counsel for petitioner.

The extraordinary jurisdiction conferred on this Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is in the nature of inherent powers and such power can be exercised to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or to otherwise secure the ends of justice. The issue concerning scope and object of Section 561-A Cr.P.C. (1898), which is pari-materia to Section 482 Cr.P.C. (1973), came up for consideration before the Constitution Bench of Supreme Court in case of State of Utter Pradesh Vs. Mohd. Naim (AIR 1964 SC 703), more particularly with reference to exercise of inherent powers for obliterating adverse remarks against an individual in the judgment. Speaking for the Court, Justice S.K. Das, while answering the question in affirmative, held:

“The second point for consideration is this, has the High Court inherent power to expunge remarks made by itself or by a lower court o prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice? There was at one time some conflict of judicial opinion on this question. The position as to case-law now seems to be that except for a somewhat restricted view taken by the Bombay High Court, the other High Courts have taken the view that though the jurisdiction is of an exceptional nature and is to be exercised in most exceptional cases only, it is undoubtedly open to the High Court to expunge remarks from a judgment in order to secure the ends of justice and prevent abuse of the process of the court ----------We think that the view taken in the High Courts other than the High Court of Bombay is correct and the High Court can in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction expunge remarks made by it or by a lower court if it be necessary to do so to prevent abuse of the process of the court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice; the jurisdiction is however of an exceptional nature and has to be exercised in exceptional cases only . (emphasis supplied)"

11. In Naranjan Patnaik Vs. Sashibhusan Kar and Anr. [(1986) 2 SCC 569], Supreme Court, while following the verdict of Constitution Bench in Mohd. Naim’s case (supra), further elaborated that harsh or disparaging remarks are not to be made against persons and authorities whose conduct comes into consideration before courts of law unless it is really necessary for the decision of the case, as an integral part thereof to animadvert on that conduct.

14. In Manish Dixit & Ors. Vs. State of Rajasthan [(2001) 1 SCC 596], Supreme Court further clarified that castigating remarks to ensue serious consequences on future career may not be made without giving opportunity of being heard to the incumbent. The Court held:

“Even those apart, this Court has repeatedly cautioned that before any castigating remarks are made by the Court against any person, particularly when such remarks could ensue serious consequences on the future career of the person concerned he should have been given an opportunity of being heard in the matter in respect of the proposed remarks or strictures. Such an opportunity is the basic requirement, for, otherwise the offending remarks would be in violation of the principles of natural justice.”

Thus, answer to the first question is in affirmative but subject to certain restrictions. As regards second question suffice it to say that power of judicial rev