Ramesh Chandra Meena vs Yogesh Jorwal @ Bhopal @ Annu

Judicial Analysis Court Copy Headnote Facts Arguments Court observation

2023 Supreme(Raj) 1793

IN THE HIGH COURT OF RAJASTHAN AT JAIPUR BENCH
Manindra Mohan Shrivastava, ACJ, Anil Kumar Upman, J.
Ramesh Chandra Meena – Appellant
Versus
Yogesh Jorwal @ Bhopal @ Annu and Others – Respondents
D.B. Criminal Appeal No. 59 of 2022
Decided On : 08-02-2023

Advocates:
Advocate Appeared:
For the Appellant : P.C. Sharma
For the Respondent: Ritesh Jain

Headnote:(A) Indian Penal Code, 1860 - Sections 302, 506 - Arms Act, 1959 - Appeal against acquittal - Acquittal affirmed based on lack of direct evidence link between firearm and the alleged injury, considering the defendant was given the benefit of doubt due to serious discrepancies in the prosecution's case. (Paras 3, 5, 6)

(B) Standard of proof - The standard for overturning an acquittal is high, requiring the appellant to demonstrate that the view taken by the Trial Court is perverse or unreasonable. (Paras 6, 7)

Facts of the case:
The appeal arises from a judgment of acquittal regarding an alleged homicide and illegal possession of a firearm. Key evidence included the testimony of the deceased's mother and evidence of a firearm recovery. However, substantial doubts were raised due to the absence of ballistic evidence linking the firearm to the alleged crime.

Findings of Court:
The Trial Court found reasonable doubt in the prosecution's case, particularly regarding the absence of direct links and material evidence.

Issues: The primary issue was the sufficiency and reliability of evidence to uphold a conviction where significant discrepancies existed.

Ratio Decidendi: The Court held that acquittal should not be disturbed unless the Trial Court's findings are proved to be manifestly perverse, reinforcing the high burden of proof required for reversing acquittals.

Result: Appeal dismissed.

Judgement Key Points

Key Points: - The appeal concerns an acquittal in a case under IPC Sections 302, 506 and Arms Act Section 3/25. (!) - The High Court affirmed the acquittal, holding that the standard to overturn an acquittal is high and the view of the Trial Court must be manifestly perverse or unreasonable. (!) - The Trial Court found reasonable doubt due to lack of direct ballistic evidence linking the firearm to the injury and other discrepancies. (!) - There was no bullet recovered or exit wound; no ballistic evidence or armorer testimony establishing linking live firearm. (!) - The appellate court held no interference with the acquittal as the Trial Court's view was plausible and supported by evidence. (!) (!) - The appeal was dismissed. (!) - The judgment references the need for direct and reliable evidence to sustain a conviction when acquittal is based on benefit of doubt. (!) (!)

Question 1?

What is the standard of review for overturning an acquittal?

Question 2?

What is the sufficiency of evidence required to disturb an acquittal in a case involving IPC Sections 302, 506 and Arms Act?

Table of Content
1. background of the appeal and original judgment. (Para 2)
2. arguments against acquittal based on evidence. (Para 3)
3. court's analysis of the trial court's findings. (Para 4 , 5)
4. limited scope of interference in acquittals. (Para 6)
5. conclusion and dismissal of the appeal. (Para 7 , 8)

JUDGMENT :

1. Heard on admission.

2. This appeal arises out of judgment of acquittal dated 03.09.2021 passed by the learned Trial Court in the matter of prosecution of Respondent No. 1 for alleged commission of offences under Sections 3 02, 506 of INDIAN PENAL CODE , 1860 and Section 3 /25 of the ARMS ACT , 1959.

3. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant/victim would argue that despite there being reliable ocular testimony of the mother of the deceased (PW-11) and corroboration of the same by the Forensic report regarding cause of death of the deceased by bullet injury and also seizure of pistol from the accused, acquittal has been ordered which is perverse and contrary to reliable piece of evidence both direct and circumstantial in nature.

4. We have gone through the impugned judgment of acquittal.

5. We find that in order to grant acquittal on benefit of doubt, the learned Trial Court has taken into consideration that the FIR itself was lodged by the so called eye-witness, the mother of the deceased, after two months of the incident. Further, we find that though there is an evidence with regard to recovery of a pistol from the accused, there is no evidence collected by the prosecution with regard to the bullet which is alleged to have caused injury to the deceased. In fact, no bullet was recovered from the body, nor any exit wound was found. Other signs of bullet injury were also not found, but only puncture wound was noted in the postmortem report. There is no report of the armorer or ballistic export to establish live link between the firearm allegedly seized from the accused. There is not even an evidence of the firearm capable of being fired. The learned Trial Court taking into consideration such serious discrepancies in the case of the prosecution, has acquitted the respondent-accused granting benefit of doubt.

6. It is well settled that the scope of interference against judgment of acquittal is extremely limited. Once the view taken by the learned Trial Court is plausible and there is possibility of more than one view out of which, one view has been preferred by the Trial Court and acquittal has been granted by giving benefit of doubt, no interference is called for.

7. Therefore, in view of the above, we do not find any ground to interfere with the impugned judgment of the acquittal.

8. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed.

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